American University Washington College of Law

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of
Law
Joint PIJIP/TLS Research Paper Series
9-2010

ACTA as a New Kind of International IP Law-Making
Kimberlee Weatherall
University of Queensland, kimberlee.weatherall@sydney.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Weatherall, Kimberlee. 2010. ACTA as a New Kind of International IP Law-Making. PIJIP Research Paper
no. 12. American University Washington College of Law, Washington, DC.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Program on Information Justice and Intellectual
Property and Technology, Law, & Security Program at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College
of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Joint PIJIP/TLS Research Paper Series by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
DCRepository@wcl.american.edu.

ACTA AS A NEW KIND OF INTERNATIONAL IP
LAW-MAKING1
Kimberlee Weatherall2
ABSTRACT
The ACTA negotiations are important not only for the potential impact of
the treaty itself, but for what they can teach us about the dynamics of
intellectual property law-making and the structure of the IP treaty
framework. This paper draws two broad lessons from the progress of the
ACTA to date which, while not entirely new, can be understood in a new
light by looking at the detailed development of the ACTA text: (1) that the
global IP 'ratchet' is not inexorable; and (2) that the international IP treaty
framework is very poorly adapted to developing exceptions. The relevance
of these lessons for negotiators, scholars and advocates is also discussed.

1

At the time this paper was researched and written, the July 1, 2010 draft of ACTA
was the most recent draft of the text. Any references to “the most recent text” and related
analysis refer to the July 1, 2010 draft. After this paper was submitted for publication, a
new draft of ACTA was leaked on Aug. 25, 2010. This paper may be revised by the author
to reflect changes made in the Aug. 25, 2010 draft text.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, or ACTA, has all the
features of the scheme of a Vaudeville Villain. We have had every possible
cliché over the course of the several years of its negotiation to date. The
exclusive group of negotiators, a kind of new ‘coalition of the willing.’ The
secrecy. The claims that keeping a text about IP enforcement confidential
was a matter of ‘national security.’3 Arguments that the whole agreement
could be stitched up without any Parliamentary or Congressional input by
‘Executive Order.’4 Reports of iPod-searching border guards (met only
with the statement that nothing in the agreement would require iPodsearching border guards…). Leaked texts, again, and again, and again.
Dissent in the ranks of the willing as some countries complained about the
secrecy. Press releases that make assertions about the text that don’t stand
up to expert scrutiny. A text that, once published, contained excruciating
3

See Declan McCullagh, Copyright Treaty is Classified for National Security,
CNET NEWS, (Mar. 12, 2009, 5:45 PM), available at http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_310195547-38.html (reporting that a response letter to a Freedom of Information Act request
by Knowledge Economy International from the Obama Administration had stated that a
discussion draft of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and related materials are
classified in the interest of national security pursuant to Executive Order 12958).
4
See Jack Goldsmith & Lawrence Lessig, Anti-counterfeiting Agreement Raises
Constitutional Concerns, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2010, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/25/AR2010032502403.html
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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detail on every conceivable way to strengthen enforcement—and none of
the usual protections for user interests but a few placeholders saying, to
paraphrase, ‘we’ll put some fuzzy soft stuff here.’ The whole process—
coming on top of numerous other initiatives in IP enforcement5—could
almost have been calculated to generate paranoia on the part of anyone who
might ever be on the receiving end of an IP lawsuit. Users. Consumer
representatives. Access to medicines advocates. Technology companies.
Cue evil music and tie the consumers to the train tracks!
All these ludicrous trappings of the sideshow, however, are wont to
distract us from taking the process seriously. By this I do not mean that
people have ignored what is going on or failed to analyse the substance of
the agreement: far from it. The reaction to ACTA and the analysis of the
text has, if anything, been something of a testament to collective, even
‘open source’ analysis. The ongoing commentary has been informed;
knowledge has been widely shared, and the text has been very closely
analysed and its implications for various interests explored in a range of
jurisdictions.6 Every strategic move in the negotiations has been analysed
on the fly.7 I do not seek to repeat that analysis here.
What I mean, rather, is that we also need to examine the process of
negotiating the ACTA for what it can tell us about the changing dynamics
of IP law-making, particularly in the enforcement space. ACTA has entered
the scene on the back of a decade of bilateral trade agreements, many of
which include detailed provisions on intellectual property, and more than a
decade of development of IP rules within Europe. It follows very closely
on a newly-announced EU policy of drafting bilateral trade agreements in
an ‘American style’ with detailed IP chapters. In a world where unilateral
action to enforce or raise IP standards has become commonplace, the
ACTA negotiations represent an important attempt post-TRIPS to undertake
broad-ranging ‘North-North’ negotiations on key areas of intellectual
property which are a gap in the TRIPS Agreement.8 We would be wrong, I

5

See generally Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting
and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: the State of Play 4 (IQsensato, Occasional Paper No. 1,
June 9, 2008), available at
http://www.iqsensato.org/wpcontent/uploads/Sell_IP_Enforcement_State_of_PlayOPs_1_June_2008.pdf (providing an excellent overview of the multiple shifting
initiatives).
6
See generally Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), PROGRAM ON
INFORMATION JUSTICE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta [hereinafter PIJIP].
7
Peter Yu, Six Secret (and now open) Fears of ACTA, 63 SMU L. REV. (forth
coming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1624813.
8
I am leaving to one side here, of course, the ongoing negotiations within the
TRIPS Council over matters such as the Geographical Indications Register. ACTA is also
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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think, to simply dismiss the ACTA as ‘yet more forum-shifting.’9 This is
where we get to see how much agreement there is the developed country
powers historically dominant in IP law-making: Japan, Europe, U.S.—and
friends—outside of the known contentiousness of the various multilateral
fora. This is also where we get to assess the impact of the bilateral
agreements—are they really a stepping stone to new international
standards?
This paper is a contribution to the analysis of ACTA as part of the
dynamics of international IP law-making. Since comprehensiveness is a
dreamer’s goal, I have picked up on two questions, drawing heavily on the
various versions of the ACTA text that have been both leaked, and
published, over time.10 First, I explore what ACTA can tell us about the
famed ‘global one-way IP ratchet’ and the impact of the last decade’s worth
of bilateral agreements on the negotiations. As will become clear, the
picture is, I think, a mixed one. Undoubtedly the mere fact that the U.S.’s
bilateral free trade agreement partners are part of the ACTA negotiations is
an indication of the role those agreements are playing, and, looking in more
detail at Australia in particular, I think it is clear that where Australia would
have been in opposition to some ACTA proposals, Australia’s Free Trade
Agreement with the U.S. removed that opposition. On the other hand,
while both the U.S. and the EU may have started ACTA with the intention
of elevating detailed aspects of their law to the level of international
agreement, the process of ACTA has been a gradual watering-down of
those provisions. This is important, because it suggests limits to the ‘oneway ratchet.’ The second issue I explore is what ACTA can teach us about

not the only time all these parties have sought to negotiate another treaty: there has, since
TRIPS, been multilateral negotiations, both successful (in the form of the WIPO
COPYRIGHT TREATY and WIPO PERFORMANCES AND PHONOGRAMS TREATY of 1996) and
unsuccessful (the proposed WIPO TREATY FOR THE PROTECTION OF BROADCASTING
ORGANIZATIONS—which was deferred in 2007 although still on the agenda of WIPO).
There have also been multilateral ‘administrative’ negotiations leading to the SINGAPORE
TREATY ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS of 2006.
9
See generally Laurence Helfer, Regime-shifting: the TRIPS Agreement and New
Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004);
Ruth Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual
Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125 (2003); Peter K. Yu, Currents and
Cross-Currents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
323, 395-96 (2004).
10
See generally Anti-Counterfeiting Trade agreement January 2010 Draft, available
at
https://docs.google.com/a/student.american.edu/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXV
sdGRvbWFpbnxpaXBlbmZvcmNlbWVudHxneDozNWJiMzU4ODljYjIzNWQ1
[hereinafter January leaked text], Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement April 2010 Draft,
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta04212010 [hereinafter April public
text], Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement July 2010 Draft, available at
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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the negotiation of exceptions in international IP law: a critical issue for user
representatives and advocates of all stripes as well as for negotiators. The
course of negotiations in ACTA over the online service provider safe
harbours clearly follows historical patterns: everyone puts their version on
the table and then everyone has trouble reconciling the differences. This is
a bad sign both for the agreement itself, and for any attempt hereafter to
draw up an international instrument on exceptions. In the course of
discussing this issue, I lay out how recent academic literature and
advocates’ attempts to conceive such an instrument hold lessons for
negotiators, but what is eminently clear is that those lessons are not, yet,
making their way into the negotiating tents.
There are lessons in this analysis, I think, on all sides. For advocates,
the analysis highlights the importance of developing alternative models for
international provisions, particularly at a domestic level but also in
conceptual instruments. For scholars in the field, I hope this work can be
part of a discussion, beyond the vaudeville, of how ACTA fits into the
broader sweep of international IP law development. And for those at the
negotiating table, it’s a plea—to take a step back from the nitty-gritty of
elevating domestic law to international treaty, and to see the process of
negotiation for what it ought to be—a process of abstraction and reaching a
compromise of interests and principles.
II.

LESSON ONE FROM THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING ACTA: TESTING THE
GLOBAL IP RATCHET THEORY
A. Can We Explain ACTA as Part of a Broader Strategy to Raise IP
Standards?

The first set of lessons we can learn from developments to date in
ACTA concerns the relationship between IP chapters in recent bilateral
trade agreements and subsequent multiparty11 negotiations. ACTA is a
testament both to the impact of bilateral agreements on countries’ positions
in later multiparty negotiations, and to the ‘endless upward spiral’ of
international IP obligations. It is also, as I explore in the next subsection,
evidence of the limits on this upward spiral and the way the strategy of
using bilateral agreements to ‘create international standards’ is failing. But
first, we need to acknowledge the strategy’s success.
http://wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta07012010 [hereinafter July leaked text].
11
The term ‘multiparty’ will be used here to refer to both plurilateral (small group)
and multilateral (international or large group) negotiations; ‘plurilateral’ and ‘multilateral’
will be used where the more specific meaning is intended.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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A matter of particular concern to commentators and non-government
organisations interested in IP issues has been the inclusion of increasingly
detailed IP chapters, enforcing IP standards well beyond those required by
TRIPS, in numerous bilateral and regional trade agreements since the turn
of the twenty-first century.12 Among them, the U.S. free trade agreements
have been the most exhaustive—extending to thirty-plus pages of detailed
provisions modelled closely on U.S. law;13 in more recent times it seems
that the EU has shifted to a similar approach.14 Some commentators have
argued that the detailed IP provisions in these agreements represent only the
first stage of a conscious strategy on the part of right holder groups, the U.S.
government, or perhaps both that has, as a longer-term goal, the eventual
incorporation of those same higher intellectual property standards in
multilateral treaties that will bind third-party countries as part of a ‘global
IP ratchet.’15 As one commentator has put it, “if enough FTAs are
12

United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (signed May 6, 2003; in force
January 1, 2004); U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement (signed June 6, 2003; in force January
1, 2004); U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement (signed June 15, 2004; in force January 1,
2006); U.S.-CAFTA (signed May 28, 2004; in force March 1, 2006 (El Salvador), April 1,
2006 (Honduras and Nicaragua), July 1, 2006 (Guatemala), March 1, 2007 (Dominican
Republic) and January 1, 2009 (Costa Rica); U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement (signed
September 14, 2004; in force August 1, 2006); U.S.-Oman Agreement (signed January 19,
2006; in force January 1, 2009); U.S.-Peru Free Trade Agreement (signed April 12, 2006;
in force February 1, 2009); U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (signed February 27,
2006, amendments agreed June 28, 2007); U.S.-Panama Free Trade Agreement (signed
June 28, 2007); U.S.-Republic of South Korea Free Trade Agreement (signed June 30,
2007).
13
See Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall, Exporting Controversy? Reactions to
the Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement: Lessons for U.S.
Trade Policy, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 259, 319.
14
See Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Third
Countries, 2005 O.J. (C 129) (noting that in the European Commission’s strategy, there
were a number of actions apparently modeled on U.S. practices, including an indication of
the intention to ‘revisit the approach to the IPR chapter of bilateral agreements, including
the clarification and strengthening of the enforcement clauses’ using EU Directives as ‘an
important source of inspiration and a useful benchmark.’); see also European UnionRepublic of South Korea Free Trade Agreement (signed Oct. 15, 2009) [hereafter ‘EUKorea Agreement’] (describing the first completed bilateral free trade agreement of the
new generation, which includes a chapter with extensive obligations on geographical
indications and enforcement).
15
See Peter Drahos, The Global Ratchet for Intellectual Property Rights: Why it
Fails as Policy and What Should be Done About It (The Open Soc’y Inst., 2003), PETER
DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM (2003), Bryan Mercurio,
TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND
THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 215 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006), Ruth
Mayne, Regionalism, Bilateralism, and “TRIP [sic] Plus” Agreements: The Threat to
Developing Countries, (UNDP Human Dev. Report, Office Occasional Paper, 2005), Peter
Drahos, BITs and BIPs – Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP.
791 (2001); but see Jagdish Bhagwati, TERMITES IN THE TRADING SYSTEM: HOW
PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS UNDERMINE FREE TRADE (2008), Ruth Okediji, Back to
Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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negotiated containing [multilateral-plus] provisions, these provisions will
essentially become the new minimum standard from which any future WTO
trade round will proceed.”16 As evidence of the ratcheting process,
commentators point to the use of bilateral mechanisms to break down
resistance, particularly amongst developing countries, to the negotiation of
the TRIPS agreement.17
Certain aspects of the international IP regime create a legal framework
conducive to such a strategy. The first is the way in which key multilateral
IP agreements of adopt ‘minimum standards’: contracting parties agree to
enact standards embodied in the agreement, but they also agree that they
can enact additional, more extensive IP protection if they so choose: but
not lower levels of protection.18 The second feature, national treatment,
refers to provisions requiring that a contracting party accord to foreign
authors or other right holders (from other contracting parties) the same
protection that it accords to its own authors or right holders.19 TRIPS
contains an even stronger principle in the form of a most favoured nation
(MFN) clause which requires that ‘any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other
OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125 (2003), Sell, supra note 5, Peter K. Yu, Currents and CrossCurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 395
(2004).
16
Mercurio, supra note 15, at 223.
17
See DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 15 , Ch.6 (noting that although the
TRIPS MFN obligation did not strengthen the effect of pre-TRIPS bilateral agreements, a
similar, but much weaker effect would have been in place at least for those countries party
to the Berne or Paris Conventions, both of which require a country to offer the same
treatment to nationals of other contracting parties as they do to their own nationals in the
areas of IP covered by those conventions including copyright, patent, designs, trade mark
and unfair competition).
18
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, art. 1(1), 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; International Convention for the
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, art.
22, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome Convention]; Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, art. 20, Sept. 9, 1886, revised July 24,
1971, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention],
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 19, March 20, 1888, as
revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, T.I.A.S. No.
6903, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention], Annette Kur & Henning Grosse
Ruse-Khan, Enough is enough: the notion of binding ceilings in international intellectual
property protection 9 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop., Competition and Tax Law
Research Paper Series No. 09-01, 2009); see also EU-Korea Agreement, supra note 14,
arts. 10(5), 10(16), 10(33), 10(39), United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, arts.
17(1)(2)-17(1)(5), (signed May 18, 2004; in force January 1, 2005) (hereafter AUSFTA),
Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement, art. 2, (signed February 17, 2003; in force July
28, 2003).
19
See TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 3, Berne Convention, supra note 18, art. 5(1), Paris
Convention, supra note 18, art. 2.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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Members.’20 Thus, where A, B and C are party to TRIPS, and A and B
agree to extend protection in copyright or patent, then authors or inventors
from C will receive the benefits.21 Assuming that A is an IP-importing
nation which sees higher IP standards as imposing net costs,22 the
combination of minimum standards plus national treatment or MFN
increases the cost to A of raising IP standards through a bilateral agreement
with B, but, perhaps more importantly, reduces the cost of later agreeing to
the same standards in a multilateral agreement.23 Thus the inclusion of
higher standards in bilaterals ought to increase the chance of those
provisions securing broader acceptance in a multilateral agreement.
Sometimes the story of this global IP ratchet is presented as if to suggest
we can expect a future of repeating cycles of bilateral negotiations, followed
periodically by consolidation of the bilateral standards at a multilateral
level,24 followed by new domestic standards, then bilateral standards . . .
20

See discussion in SAM RICKETSON & JANE GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND,

301-305
[6.80] – [6.82] (2006) (discussing this long-established principle in IP Treaties, as evident
from the Berne and Paris Conventions); but cf. The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, arts. 1, 24(5), 24(8), (opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947), 61 Stat. pts. 5 & 6,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT] (noting that it is unusual under the
GATT to require advantages offered in an FTA to be generalized since the WTO
champions the ‘most favoured nation.’ Although there is an exception when it comes to
obligations undertaken in a customs union or free trade area, this exception does not have
effect in relation to IP, because Article 4 in TRIPS establishes a stricter most favoured
nation principle, or requirement of national treatment, for intellectual property rights).
21
See TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 4. (describing the following situation: imagine
that Countries A, B and C are all party to the Berne Convention. In theory, A could agree
with B to provide B’s citizens with certain additional minimum standards, but such an
agreement might not require that A’s citizens receive the same standard of protection. In
this case, Country C could only demand national treatment: what A provides A’s citizens,
less than what A provides B’s citizens. Most Favoured Nation treatment, on the other
hand, would require that C’s citizens receive the same treatment as B’s citizens. Thus
MFN is stronger than national treatment plus minimum standards).
22
See generally KEITH MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (2000), J. Revesz, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Austl.
Productivity Comm’n, Staff Research Paper, 1999), available at
http://www.pc.gov.au/research/staffres/trips/trips.pdf (conducting an analysis of Australia’s
IP ‘interests’ and concluding that ‘in most cases gains would be maximized).
23
See Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements 13.14-13.15, (Austl. Productivity
Comm’n, Draft Research Report, 2010).
24
See Ruth Okediji, TRIPs Dispute Settlement and the Sources of (International)
Copyright Law 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 585, 602–04 (2001) (noting that formal
multilateralisation is not the only mechanism by which the influence of FTA provisions
could influence the obligations of third parties as bilateral agreements may also affect third
countries’ international obligations by ‘form[ing] the context for the interpretation of
treaties’ such as the WIPO Internet Treaties or TRIPS. The argument is based on Article
31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 which states that ‘‘any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation’’ shall be taken into account.); see also Ruth Okediji,
The International Copyright System: Limitations, Exceptions and Public Interest
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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and so on. The potential consequences are serious. As Kur and Ruse-Khan
state, for example, ‘once a substantial portion of trading partners have
agreed to observe the same standards as those enshrined in present U.S./EU
legislation, there is no way back to a meaningful lessening of what appear
as widely accepted rules… creating a spiral endlessly moving upwards.’25
The negotiation of the ACTA is an interesting case study to test this
assumption of inevitable one-way ‘ratcheting up’ of IP obligations and the
role of bilateral in facilitating this process. If the U.S. and EU FTAs are
indeed ‘stepping stones’ to multilateralisation, it is appropriate to ask how
that ‘project’ is going at an intermediate (plurilateral) setting. Clearly, the
goal of the ACTA is to strengthen the provisions on enforcement beyond
those presently found in the TRIPS Agreement; as numerous commentators
have noted, the various texts of ACTA clearly demonstrate an intention to
elaborate on TRIPS standards and remove flexibilities. ‘TRIPS-plus’
aspects of the ACTA include proposals to prescribe factors a court must
consider in calculating damages;26 a proposal to require statutory or
additional damages or at least presumptions for calculating damages;27
extensive powers to require infringers to provide information;28 and
extensions to the powers of customs officials at the border.29 The ACTA
text also proposes the removal of certain flexibilities found in TRIPS: for
example, Article 44.2 which allows a country to make injunctions

Considerations for Developing Countries 4 (ICTSD ISSUE PAPER NO. 15, 2006) (referring
to a ‘common law’ established by treaties. These kinds of influence however could only
operate at a high level of generality, and would require more than a series of FTAs
involving one dominant country. So, e.g., U.S. bilateral agreements might be part of a case
for interpreting the WIPO Internet Treaties as requiring both a prohibition on
circumvention of technological protection measures and a prohibition on the circulation of
circumvention devices. However, the U.S.’ FTAs alone would not be sufficient: an
international tribunal would seek evidence that other countries supported that view).
25
Annette Kur & Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 18 at 13-14.
26
Cf. TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 45 (noting that unlike TRIPS art. 45 which specifies
no factors at all, factors specified in the April Public Text are ‘any legitimate measure of
value submitted by the right holder, which may include the lost profits, the value of the
infringed good or service, measured by the market price, the suggested retail price, or [the
profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement]’).
27
See generally TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 45.2 (describing the measures that are
allowed but not required under TRIPS).
28
Cf. TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 47 (stating that only Members may provide that
their judicial authorities can require an infringer to reveal ‘the identity of third persons
involved in the production and distribution of the infringing goods and of their channels of
distribution.’ The ACTA April Public Draft makes this mandatory and elaborates on the
kinds of information that may be required).
29
See Kimberlee G. Weatherall, ACTA - AUSTRALIAN SECTION BY SECTION
ANALYSIS (2010), available at http://works.bepress.com/kimweatherall/21 (analyzing the
April text); see also PIJIP, supra note 6.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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unavailable, so long as adequate remuneration is provided for.30 In this
most basic sense, as a TRIPS-plus agreement, ACTA is consistent with the
pattern of ever-increasing standards and hence a part of the general global
IP one-way ratchet.
The more interesting story, however, is how ACTA relates to the
various bilateral agreements of the last decade. At first glance it looks like
the evidence backs the theory. Several of the countries participating in the
ACTA negotiations are party to a U.S. FTA (Singapore, Morocco, and
Australia, with Korea also a signatory to an FTA pending before the U.S.
Congress31) or an EU agreement (Korea).32 What is more, it seems clear
that the negotiating position of these FTA-bound countries on controversial
issues within the ACTA have been influenced by their FTAs.
Australia is one example. Australia’s FTA with the U.S. required a
range of changes to Australian IP law.33 Importantly, prior to her FTA with
the U.S.,34 Australia’s IP enforcement laws differed the draft provisions of
ACTA on key issues. For example, two of the most controversial areas in
the ACTA to date have been the digital chapter and the criminal provisions.
On the former, Australia’s pre-FTA copyright law embodied its own
‘Australian-grown’ implementation of the WIPO Copyright Treaty. It did
not prohibit the act of circumventing a technological protection measure,35
on the basis that the real harm to copyright owners occurred through the
creation of a market for circumvention devices and services, and that a ban
on circumvention could not be effectively enforced and intruded too
significantly into the private sphere.36 It included no safe harbours for
30

See generally Comments on ACTA Provisions on Injunctions and Damages
(Knowledge Ecology Int’l, Research Note 2010:1), available at
http://keionline.org/node/826.
31
Jordan, which has an (earlier model) FTA with the U.S., and the United Arab
Emirates, which has held some FTA negotiations with the U.S., were also part of the first
round of negotiations but did not continue their involvement. EU ACTA Negotiator
Confirms EU Wants Patent Provisions in ACTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 8, 2009, at
11. Mexico too is a party to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which
includes some higher standards than are found in TRIPS. However, most of the key
concerns in ACTA are not reflected in the NAFTA text which predates, for example, the
WIPO Internet Treaties.
32
It may be cynical, but nevertheless accurate to note that drafts of the ACTA to
date have provided that five instruments of ratification will be sufficient to bring the
Agreement into force: April Public Draft Article 6.2.
33
See Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall, supra note 13.
34
AUSFTA, supra note 18.
35
Australia’s Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth).
36
Joint Submission from the Attorney-General’s Department and the Department of
Communications, Information Technology and the Arts to the HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS
INQUIRY INTO THE COPYRIGHT AMENDMENT (DIGITAL AGENDA) BILL 1999, available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/digitalagenda/Sub75.pdf, at paragraphs
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online service providers, leaving it to the courts to develop the law of
secondary liability as it related to online intermediaries, and, while it is fair
to say that Australia would, even without the FTA, have considered
introducing some kind of safe harbours or at least a code of conduct for
online service providers, there is reason to doubt they would have matched
either the U.S. or EU provisions.37 On criminal provisions, too, Australia’s
law was narrower than initial U.S. proposals for ACTA. Pre-FTA Australia
applied criminal penalties where infringement was related to trade or
commerce, and in non-commercial cases only where it could be shown that
the distribution of copies had a substantial prejudicial impact on the
copyright owner. Post-FTA, Australia also applies criminal law to noncommercial acts of copying that have such an impact: thus extending the
criminal law to prolific downloaders, for example, as well as people
uploading (and hence distributing).38
It seems unlikely that Australia would have simply accepted significant
changes to its copyright law via the ACTA.39 Post-FTA, however,
Australia has both political and legal reasons to discount the ACTA’s
domestic importance, and reduced incentives to spend effort or political
capital opposing even provisions that had previously been contrary to
domestic policy. From a political perspective, the Australian government
can portray the ACTA as requiring no changes to Australian law, and hence
as bringing only benefits (in the form of better protection for Australian

[3.45]-[3.48]; see also RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 20, at 978, para. 15.20, M.
FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET, 549-50, para. C11.12. (Oxford
University Press, 2002), J. REINBOTHE & S. VON LEWINSKI, THE WIPO COPYRIGHT
TREATIES 1996, 145 [23] (2002).
37
Phillips Fox, Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000, DIGITAL AGENDA
REVIEW REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6-7 (2004) (noting that a review by Australia
found that ‘there [was] real uncertainty as to what steps Service Providers need to take in
order to protect themselves from liability for authorisation of copyright infringement.’ To
reduce that uncertainty it recommended a notice and take down procedure balancing the
interests of owners and users. The Report (at pp. 84-87) made detailed recommendations
which would not have matched either the U.S. or EU systems).
38
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s.132AC (new in 2006). Despite the obscure wording
of this provision (influenced by rather eccentric Australian criminal law drafting
conventions), it creates liability for individuals who engage in infringement ‘on a
commercial scale’ that has a ‘substantial prejudicial impact on the copyright owner’ and
hence complies with Australia’s obligation to introduce liability for ‘significant wilful
infringements of copyright, that have no direct or indirect motivation of financial gain’
(AUSFTA Article 17.11.26).
39
This assertion receives some support from the fact that a reference to ‘additional
damages’ has appeared in the ACTA text as an alternative to statutory damages (see, for
example, Article 2.2.2(c) in the April Public Text). Although no particular country’s name
is attached to the amendment, even in the leaked July text, this provision likely reflects a
resolve on the part of Australia to protect her own system of additional damages—as she
did in negotiating the Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (see Article 17.11.7(b)).
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right holders overseas) and little or no costs (in the sense that it does not
even make the usual losers from extended IP rights—Australian users—any
worse off).40 This may have deprived some negotiating parties of a
potential ally. Pre-FTA, discussions of the criminal provisions would likely
have seen common ground between Australia and the EU, with both taking
the view that in general criminalisation of end-users is a bad idea.41 On its
position on anti-circumvention, Australia would have had common interests
with New Zealand, which today, like Australia pre-2004, has no prohibition
on the act of circumvention.42 Australia’s story thus provides some
evidence for the success of a ‘ratchet’ strategy: AU.S.FTA removed
potential opposition and made Australia a country which could sign up to
high enforcement standards in the ACTA.
I hasten to note that this assessment of the political calculus facing
Australia in the ACTA negotiations is, I think, realistic as a reflection of the
way Australian negotiators must have been thinking. This does not mean,
however, that I believe it is an accurate representation of Australia’s actual
interests. First, this reasoning only holds so long as, and to the extent that,
ACTA is consistent with post-FTA Australian law. It is by no means clear
that this will be the case: drafts of ACTA to date have been not just TRIPSplus, but AU.S.FTA-plus.43 ACTA is not just TRIPS-plus, for Australia,
drafts to date have also been AU.S.FTA-plus.44 This, however, is
something that can only be ascertained after the text is finalised, and, to be

40

Indeed, the cynically-minded might even argue that Australia will benefit from
other countries signing up to the stringent IP laws to which it is subject as a result of its
bilateral agreement with the United States—and not just because more harmonised laws
worldwide reduce transaction costs for Australian right holders. Stringent IP laws have the
potential to impose costs on users—both public and private sector—in Australia. To take
just one example, copyright law imposes a not-insignificant cost each year on Australian
educational institutions. If similar costs are not being borne in other jurisdictions then
Australian user groups are at some disadvantage. From this perspective, it is advantageous
for an already-bound Australia to encourage other countries to bind themselves to similarly
stringent standards
41
See Kimberlee Weatherall, Of Copyright Bureaucracies and Incoherence:
Stepping Back from Australia’s Recent Copyright Reforms 31 (3) MELB. U. L. REV. 967,
984 (2007) (explaining that amendments Australia made to its criminal copyright laws in
2006 were drafted with the explicit goal of not extending liability to end-users in most
cases after Parliamentarians expressed concerns about ‘criminalising kids’); see also
SUPPLEMENTARY EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, COPYRIGHT AMENDMENT BILL 2006
(Aust.) and FURTHER SUPPLEMENTARY EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, COPYRIGHT
AMENDMENT BILL 2006 (Aust.).
42
See Copyright Act 1994 (NZ) ss.226A, 226E(1).
43
See Weatherall, supra note 29 (undertaking an exhaustive analysis of the publicly
released April 2010 text of the ACTA to consider its impact on Australian law if adopted.
Although based on superseded text, that analysis identified a number changes that might be
required).
44
See id. at 1-2 (listing provisions in the April Public Draft that would require
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fair, DFAT in Australia has consistently stated that taking part in the
negotiations will not oblige Australia to sign a completed treaty: if the
differences are significant the attitude of the negotiators and their advice to
government could change.
More importantly, the calculus outlined above fails to take into account
certain broader political considerations that ought to be important. While
the FTA has reduced the immediately apparent costs of adopting stringent
provisions in a concluded ACTA, there are strong arguments that even an
ACTA entirely consistent with post-FTA law is not in any IP-importing
FTA country’s interests, for four broad reasons. First, on the domestic
front, such a country will receive little benefit, and may endure further
costs, from the further consolidation of stringent IP standards.45 Although a
U.S. FTA reduces a country’s policy flexibility, the only party who can
complain about non-compliance is the U.S., which is itself something of a
scofflaw when it comes to its international obligations in IP.46 Further
consolidation of such standards at a plurilateral level would only decrease
flexibility and increase the number of trade partners who may complain of
failure to meet standards.47 Second, from a pragmatic perspective, a
changes to Australian law).
45
See generally supra note 22 (describing the argument which rests on a view that
as an IP-importing country, strengthening IP law beyond the level established in
multilateral agreements has more costs than benefits to the national economy).
46
Cf. Berne Convention, supra note 18, arts. 6bis, 5(2), 7(1) (noting that the U.S.
continues to refuse to provide proper moral rights protection for authors (art. 6bis),
maintains financial penalties for foreign copyright owners who fail to register works before
bringing an enforcement action, despite Berne’s prohibition on formalities (art. 5(2)), and
the U.S. method of calculating copyright term in ‘works for hire’ is contrary Art. 7(1) of
the Berne Convention); it is not clear whether the U.S. complies with its obligations to
protect all temporary reproductions, as required under (for example) AUSFTA, above note
18, Article 17.4.1, given recent case law such as Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v CSC
Holdings, Inc 536 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2008). The U.S. Copyright Office has asserted
that the reproduction right covers ‘all reproductions from which economic value can be
derived’: U.S. Copyright Office, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT (Aug. 2001) at 111. Cf.
AUSFTA, Art. 17.4.1, which contains no limitation on the basis of economic value or
significance. Finally, there is America’s continued failure to comply with the ruling in the
s.110(5) decision. That case, which went in part against the United States, concerned
whether certain newly introduced exceptions to the performance right in musical works
under U.S. law were compatible with the TRIPS Agreement. See WT/DS160/R (June 15,
2000) and note the subsequent arbitration proceedings: WT/DS/160/12 (January 15, 2001).
47
Admittedly ACTA will not, it appears, contain any mechanism for enforcement of
its obligations. Cf. the AUSFTA which allows for formal dispute resolution and retaliation
for failure to comply (Ch.21). Early texts had references to the Committee of ACTA having
‘dispute resolution’ powers which disappeared from the July 2010 leaked text. However,
non-compliance is not necessarily costless: (a) ACTA could be included in future
agreements that do have enforcement mechanisms, such as future FTAs, and (b) in
diplomatic contexts, particularly when negotiating new agreements of any type, compliance
with existing obligations could be important in engendering the necessary trust or
convincing another country to enter or complete negotiations.
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country for whom stronger IP standards are not a local policy priority is
surely better off making any agreement to raise standards conditional on
receipt of benefits in areas of direct economic interest: for example, access
for agricultural goods, or, perhaps, aid that is not tied to IP-related technical
assistance. When Australia signed the FTA with the U.S. it knew that
higher IP standards represented a net cost, but it could balance those costs
against other perceived benefits, such as greater access to visas for
professionals. It is also arguable, on the international front, that the ACTA
is not in the interests of a country’s nationals trading overseas: Australians
and Australian companies will not always be the complainants in IP
proceedings overseas, and the border measures regime set out in the ACTA
drafts could easily be used by local competitors to delay Australian imports
or extract commercial-in-confidence information.48 Insofar as the ACTA
provisions increase the power of administrative authorities, police,
prosecutors, and judges, it behoves us to consider the potential dangers: not
least, that official corruption is endemic in many countries. Two ACTA
negotiating countries, Mexico and Morocco, for example, lie equal 89th on
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (‘TICPI’) for
2009 (out of 180).49 Further, to the extent that the negotiating parties intend
to seek expansion of the membership of ACTA, this issue will be of more
importance. Australia for example has mentioned a desire that ACTA be
attractive to ‘countries in our region.’50 Regardless of how realistic that
desire is, it is worth noting that Indonesia and the Solomon Islands lie equal
111th on the TICPI. Papua New Guinea lies equal 154th and Timor-Leste
equal 146th. Vietnam sits at equal 120th. And so on.
Finally, there is a cost, albeit an inchoate one, to a country like Australia
in appearing to act as a ‘Deputy Sheriff’, promoting costly IP standards for
which the benefit flows to other countries. The Australian Productivity
Commission recently addressed the question whether Australia should
include IP enforcement provisions in its bilateral trade agreements, in an
argument that has force as it relates to the ACTA agreement:
‘most of the benefits to IP rights holders from measures to promote
adherence to existing rules in partner countries [i.e. IP enforcement
48

I am imagining here a competitor paying a bribe to a customs official to seize
goods, and demand information, on the basis that goods are allegedly ‘infringing’, which
they may or may not be. Any system that grants significant powers to officials such as
customs officials holds some risk where corruption is a problem.
49
Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, available
at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009.
50
The Australian approach to the ACTA, AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND TRADE, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/index.html.
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provisions] can be expected to accrue to third parties, such as rights holders
in the United States. Again, the question would arise as to whether Australia
should ‘carry the water’ for others, when doing so would diminish the
bargaining coin available to negotiate for other reforms by the partner
country of potentially more benefit to both it and Australia.’51
While the Productivity Commission is here talking about ‘bargaining
coin’ in the context of bilateral negotiations (IP provisions in return for
agricultural market access, for example), it is arguable that Australia also
spends ‘diplomatic reputational coin’52 by being part of an agreement
explicitly seen as a threat by two of Australia’s top ten trading partners,
India and China, at a time when Australia is actively seeking to conclude a
free trade agreement with both of them.53
All these costs – the need to make further amendments to IP law; the
cost of increased constraints on domestic policy-making, the potential for
harm to nationals trading overseas and reputational harm ought to be
weighed by a rational negotiator against any potential benefits to a country
of having standards raised in other ACTA partners. It is hard to see the
benefits being large enough to overcome the potential costs.
Thus far I have discussed what ATCA tells us about the use of bilaterals
as a stepping stone to broader agreement. But ACTA itself could also be
seen as a stepping stone to broader agreement. Thus the ratchet argument
could be used as an explanation (or, from a right holder’s perspective, a
justification) for the existence of ACTA and the form in which the
negotiations have proceeded. As noted at the outset, the whole form of the
ACTA negotiations, in purporting to address global counterfeiting but
involving none of the major sources of counterfeit goods—is weird.54 But it

51

Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements 13.16 (Austl. Productivity Comm’n,
Draft Research Report, 2010).
52
See id. at 7.14-7.18.
53
See generally Australian trade policy and news, AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/index.html
(noting that in 2008, China was Australia’s second most significant trading partner (13.2%
of two way trade) and India was eighth (3.4% of two way trade). Both are potential FTA
partners: Australia has had a number of rounds of negotiation with China and in May 2010
Australia and India completed a Joint Feasibility Study into a possible Australia-India
FTA. Both India and China made statements criticising the ACTA initiative in the July
2010 meeting of the TRIPS Council).
54
Cf. WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION, CUSTOMS AND IPR REPORT 2008, at 9
(noting that out off the top 10 countries of departure of counterfeit goods reported by the
World Customs Organization in 2008, only one—the United States itself—is part of
ACTA. The top 10 (top 9, in fact, because sometimes the departure country is unknown)
were in descending order; China, Unknown, Hong Kong (China), India, Thailand, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates, U.S., Poland and Hungary).
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makes sense if you build in a presumption that agreements between ‘likeminded’ (can-do?55) countries can be stepping stone to broader multilateral
agreements that will bind source countries. There is explicit evidence for
this evangelising goal in the statements of negotiators, who have cited a
goal of establishing ‘a new standard of intellectual property (IP)
enforcement’, or ‘enforcement best practice.’56 At the time of writing,
Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade asserts on its website
that ‘Australia regards the extent to which the ACTA can attract support
from countries in our region as one important issue in determining the value
of the ACTA for Australia.’57 The publicly released negotiating text of the
ACTA includes provisions to enable a broader membership, including
developing countries, with accession processes and provisions to allow for
technical assistance and capacity-building for developing country members
seeking to join.58 I will turn to whether this is a realistic goal shortly.
But in sum, we have evidence, through the ACTA process, that the IP
ratchet is working. It would appear that the AU.S.FTA bilateral agreement
has been a ‘stepping stone’ in that it removed Australia as a potential
opponent to certain provisions. Moreover the ‘ratchet strategy’ is an
explicit motivator of the ACTA itself, with the negotiators openly
canvassing the possibility of establishing international standards of broader
application. And while I have argued that the ACTA if concluded would
have costs for Australia and other U.S. FTA signatory countries that
outweigh any conceivable benefits, this perspective does not appear to have
influenced at least the Australian negotiators to date.
B. The Rise Isn’t Inexorable: How ACTA Steps Back from the Strongest
Standards
Despite this positive evidence for the IP ratchet, a closer examination of
the ACTA negotiations to date also exposes the weakness of the strategy.
ACTA demonstrates that the provisions in the bilateral FTAs are simply not

55

Robert B. Zoellick, America Will Not Wait for the Won‘t-do Countries,
FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 22, 2003, at 23 (noting that the United States would
separate the ‘can do’ countries from the ‘won‘t do,’ and would move towards free trade
with [only] can-do countries).
56
Objectives of the ACTA, AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
TRADE, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/index-old.html; see also U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SPECIAL 301 REPORT 4 (2008), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf (noting that
“ACTA is envisioned as a leadership effort among countries that will raise the international
standard for IPR enforcement”).
57
The Australian approach to the ACTA, supra note 50.
58
See April public text, supra note 10, art. 3.3.
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‘multilateralisable,’ and have had to be watered down in the context of
plurilateral negotiations: a fact that was always apparent in theory but for
which has only now become demonstrable in fact.59 In ACTA, the
standards are, of necessity, going backwards, not forwards.
The most striking examples may be found in the development of the
‘digital enforcement chapter.’ At least in early drafts, this part of the ACTA
addresses secondary liability, safe harbours for online service providers,
anti-circumvention provisions and the protection of rights management
information. Based on an analysis of both early leaked texts and the
‘official’ public text released in April 2010, the initial proposal for the
‘digital chapter,’ drafted by the U.S., embodied many provisions similar to
the U.S. FTAs, including strong anti-circumvention provisions based on the
U.S. DMCA and online service provider safe harbours containing
conditions based on those found in 17 U.S.C. §512. This looks like a
concerted effort by the U.S. to ‘multilateralise’ its FTA provisions. The
EU, however, has its own rules, which differs in significant ways from the
DMCA, embodied in two directives. The first is the Information Society
Directive,60 a hard fought compromise among the members of the European
Union that took five years to negotiate and a considerable time to
implement.61 The second is the E-Commerce Directive, which provides
horizontal protections for online service providers analogous to the U.S.’
‘safe harbours,’ itself controversial and presently overdue for review.62
Leaked documents appearing to be internal European Union documents
from 200963 commenting on the U.S. proposals suggest that the major
concern of the EU was how the U.S.-oriented proposals fit with the EU

59

See Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 13.
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the
information society, O.J. L 167, 22/06/2001 P. 0010 – 0019.
61
See Martin Kretschmer, Digital Copyright: The End of an Era, 2003 EUROPEAN
INTELLECTUAL PROP. REV. 333 (noting that few countries have implemented within the original
deadline).
62
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic
commerce, in the Internal Market OJ L 178, 17/7/2000, 1–16 (explaining that ‘horizontal’
protection means that online service providers are protected from liability, not just in
copyright, but across other areas of law such as trade mark, or defamation or others).
63
There have been several leaks of documents which appear to be internal European
Union documents concerning the ACTA negotiations from 2009. While obviously none
have been officially confirmed, the contents of the documents are not inconsistent with the
‘official’ negotiating text publicly released in April 2010. The documents include a
document titled ‘ACTA Negotiations’ and dated 30 September 2009 (Ref. 588/09) (Memo
1), and a further document, dated 29 October 2009 and titled ‘European Union Comments
to the U.S. Proposal Special Requirements Related to the Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights in the Digital Environment. Copies of these documents are on file with the
60
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acquis communautaire represented by these directives. These internal
documents are entirely free of commentary on the position taken by other
countries—underlining their irrelevance to the EU’s internal calculus.
Over the course of the negotiations we have seen an accommodation of
EU positions in the text and the watering-down of the U.S.’s proposal: a
process which Geist has described as a ‘gradual caving’ by the U.S..64
Consider, for example, the anti-circumvention provisions. Here even the
initial draft produced by the U.S. did not incorporate a full set of provisions
from the U.S. FTA model. Most notably, unlike the FTAs, none of the
available draft ACTA texts have sought to impose a closed list of
exceptions.65 This alone makes the ACTA text much less prescriptive than
either the U.S.’s FTAs,66 or EU and U.S. laws, all of which place
stringent—but very different—limits on allowable exceptions.67 Neither the
U.S., nor the EU, for example, has a general exception to allow
circumvention for the purposes of fair use or equivalents. The draft ACTA,
however, would allow such an exception.68
author.
64

Michael Geist, U.S. Caves on Anti-Circumvention Rules in ACTA, MICHAEL
GEIST BLOG (July 19, 2010), available at
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5210/125/ (explaining that ‘While the U.S.
initially proposed an aggressive draft chapter it hoped would export U.S. law to all ACTA
partners, it has now caved on many key issues with the European language carrying the
day’).
65
See generally January leaked text, supra note 10 (nothing that the U.S. proposed
text provided that parties could ‘adopt exceptions and limitations … so long as they do not
significantly impair the adequacy of legal protection…’).
66
The closed list of exceptions, particularly the very narrow list of exceptions for
provision of circumvention devices, was one of the most criticised aspects of the IP
Chapter of the AUSFTA. A report by a Parliamentary Committee referred to this as a
‘lamentable and inexcusable flaw ... that verges on absurdity’: HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS,
REVIEW OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTION MEASURES EXCEPTIONS (February 2006), at 87
para. [3.118].
67
The U.S. has two lists of exceptions: a longer list to exempt activities
circumventing TPMs, and a very short list to exempt the manufacturing or distribution of
circumvention devices or provision of circumvention services. This approach has been
exported in the U.S. FTAs: see eg AUSFTA, above n18, Article 17.4.7. The EU approach
is quite different: Article 6.4 of the Information Society Directive (above n60) requires that
‘Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that right holders make available
to the beneficiary of an exception or limitation provided for in national law’ where that
exception is one of a confined list (which includes such acts as copying by libraries,
educational institutions, galleries and archives, or copying/communication in the form of
illustration for the purposes of teaching or research, or for the reporting of news or the
assistance of persons with a disability). Interestingly, the EU has apparently decided to
‘export’ its basic anti-circumvention obligations in its ‘new generation’ FTAs such as the
EU-Korea Agreement (above n14) but does not seek to export its exceptions: Article
10.12.
68
Some stakeholders might argue that such an exception would be invalid because it
would ‘significantly impair the adequacy of legal protection’ for technological protection
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Early drafts did, however, incorporate other features of the U.S. DMCA:
explicit protection for both access and copy controls; a prohibition on both
the act of circumvention (in the case of copy controls) and manufacture,
sale or distribution of circumvention devices; and both civil and criminal
liability for violations of either prohibition. Even this draft was a step too
far. The EU, Japan and New Zealand—countries not already bound by U.S.
FTAs—all expressed doubt about the inclusion of access controls and
criminal penalties.69 The text publicly released in April 2010 clearly
demonstrates that these differences continued in the Wellington round of
negotiations, with square brackets separating out any reference to access
controls or criminal penalties. The leaked text dated July 2010—after the
round in Luzern, Switzerland in June-July 2010—shows a further shift
away from the U.S.’s preferred model to a form of language that can
accommodate a range of anti-circumvention laws. This is best illustrated by
putting the U.S.’ proposed text from January 2010 beside the text the U.S.
was proposing by July 2010. Key differences are underlined:
Table 1: U.S. proposals on anti-circumvention provisions: January v July 2010
January 2010

July 2010

measures (see above n65). This would be difficult to prove in the short to medium term.
69
Three other negotiating countries who appear to be relatively silent at least on
early drafts are not party to a U.S. FTA following the recent model: Canada, Mexico and
Switzerland. Leaked drafts do not record any interventions/amendments proposed by
Mexico, which has, for some years, had a number of proposed amendments to its limited
anti-circumvention provisions and fairly constant pressure from right holders group: see,
for example, International Intellectual Property Alliance’s Submission relating to the 2010
Special 301 Report on Copyright Protection and Enforcement (Mexico), available at
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2010/2010SPEC301MEXICO.pdf (copy on file with author).
Switzerland had a number of limited comments. However it is worth noting that right
holder groups’ complaints against anti-circumvention law in Switzerland concern a
provision (Federal Law on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights adopted on 9 October 1992
(Switzerland), Article 39(a)(4)) allowing circumvention ‘for the purposes of a use
permitted by law’—including a quite broad exception covering private copying (Article
19): see, for example, the International Intellectual Property Alliance’s Submission relating
to the 2010 Special 301 Report on Copyright Protection and Enforcement (Switzerland),
available at http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2010/2010SPEC301SWITZERLAND.pdf (copy on
file with author). Thus Swiss departures from a U.S. or EU model are allowed under the
ACTA text’s generous approach to exceptions. On the face of the leaked documents, it
appears that Canada has made few comments on the anti-circumvention provisions, which
could be explained by simultaneous developments in Bill C-32, presently before the
Canadian Parliament, which adopts a relatively stringent set of anti-circumvention
provisions closely modelled on U.S. law: see Bill C-32, s.47 (proposed s.41). Again,
where the Canadian Bill departs from the U.S./EU models is on exceptions and remissions
of penalties, where the ACTA draft would allow much flexibility. However, it should be
noted that the anti-circumvention provisions of the Canadian Bill have been the most
controversial, which raises the possibility of amendment prior to passage.
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In implementing Article 11 of the
WIPO Copyright Treaty and Article 18 of
the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty,
regarding
adequate
legal
protection and effective legal remedies
against the circumvention of effective
technological measures that are used by
authors, performers, or producers or
phonograms in connection with the
exercise of their rights and that restrict
unauthorized acts in respect of their
works, performances, and phonograms,
each Party shall provide for civil
remedies, as well as criminal penalties, in
appropriate cases of willful conduct, that
apply to:
(a) the unauthorized circumvention
of an effective technological
measure that controls access to a
protected work, performance or
phonogram; and
(b) the manufacture, importation, or
circulation of a technology,
service, device, product,
component, or part thereof, that
is: marketed or primarily
designed or produced for the
purpose of circumventing an
effective technological measure;
or that has only a limited
commercially significant
purpose or use other than
circumventing an effective
technological measure.

Each Party shall provide adequate legal
protection and effective legal remedies at least
against the circumvention of effective
technological measures that are used by, or at
the direction of, authors, and performers and
producers of phonograms in connection with
the exercise of their rights and that restrict acts
in respect of their works, performances, and
phonograms, which are not authorised by the
authors, performers or the producers of
phonograms concerned or permitted by law.
In order to provide such adequate legal
protection and effective legal remedies, each
Party shall provide protection at least against:
(a) the unauthorized circumvention of an
effective technological measure that
restricts acts not authorized by the
right holder and is carried out
knowingly or with reasonable
grounds to know; and
(b) the manufacture, importation, or
distribution of, or offer to distribute,
a device or product, that circumvents
an effective technological measure
and is either:
(i) primarily designed or
produced for the purpose of
circumventing an effective
technological measure; or
(ii) has only a limited
commercially significant
purpose other than
circumventing an effective
technological measure

The table shows only the U.S. proposals and does not include footnotes,
including the (important and disputed) definition of what counts as a
technological protection measure: where the U.S. has maintained its
proposal to include measures that ‘control access’ to works—an approach
challenged by the EU and rejected by New Zealand.70
70

The relevant provisions would have been inconsistent with New Zealand’s law,
which clearly excludes access protection measures: Copyright Act 1994 (NZ) s.226 (‘does
not include a process, treatment, mechanism, device, or system to the extent that, in the
normal course of operation, it only controls any access to a work for non-infringing
purposes’). European law in the Information Society Directive does not talk about access
protection measures simpliciter: instead, it talks about ‘technology, ... that, in the normal
course of its operation, is designed to prevent or restrict acts, ... which are not authorised by
the right holder of any copyright ...Technological measures shall be deemed "effective"
where the use of a protected work or other subject-matter is controlled by the right holders
through application of an access control or protection process, such as encryption,
scrambling or other transformation of the work or other subject-matter or a copy control
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But the table does show a number of important differences indicating a
shift on the part of the U.S. away from provisions it has insisted on without
variation in its FTAs, and towards narrower and weaker language that will
accommodate both the U.S. and EU models.71 The reference to criminal
penalties disappeared. The language indicating the overall scope of the
laws was reduced, to focus on technical measures that restrict acts not
authorised by the right holder or law—where the earlier draft refers only to
acts authorised by right holders—a difference that could be important in
cases such as, for example, technology that seeks to restrict acts not within a
copyright owner’s rights, such as on-sale of existing copies or, in some
cases, region-coding. The prohibition on circumvention in (a) has similarly
changed—from a prohibition on circumventing any access control to a
prohibition on circumventing a measure that restricts ‘acts not authorised by
the right holder’ (with a footnote to allow the U.S. to retain its approach of
allowing circumvention of copy controls72). Part (b) has also changed in a
way that requires, where the earlier draft did not, that a measure actually be
capable of circumventing a technical measure before liability will arise, and
which apparently allows for the circulation of technologies where the
primary purpose is not circumvention. Proposals by other countries would
soften the language still further. One proposal for example would (only)
require adequate legal protection in appropriate cases—thus allowing for
exclusions of certain technologies, like those found in legislation in
Australia and New Zealand.73

mechanism, which achieves the protection objective.’: Information Society Directive, above
n60, Article 6.3. Thus it appears to suggest that access measures are protected only where
they ‘achieve the protection directive’. IVIR’s study of the implementation of the directive
however did note that most countries had accepted that access control technology was
covered: Lucie Guibault et al, STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECT IN MEMBER
STATES’ LAWS OF DIRECTIVE 2001/29/EC ON THE HARMONISATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS
OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: FINAL REPORT,
Institute for Information Law, (February 2007).
71
Notably the shifts have not, at the time of writing, gone far enough to accommodate
the existing rules of a smaller country like New Zealand. New Zealand’s copyright law as
amended in 2008 prohibits only the distribution/circulation of circumvention devices and
the provision of circumvention services (Copyright Act 1994 (NZ) s.226A): it does not
prohibit the act of circumvention and indeed positively states that ‘nothing in this Act
prevents any person from using a TPM circumvention device to exercise a permitted act
under Part 3’ (part 3 includes New Zealand’s copyright exceptions): s.226E(1). In the July
draft New Zealand is recorded as proposing removing the prohibition on circumvention.
72
See Copyright Protection and Management Systems, Circumvention of copyright
protection systems 17 U.S.C. § 1201(1)(a)(A) (1999).
73
In New Zealand, the definition of a technological protection measure is explicitly
stated not to include mechanism ‘to the extent that, in the normal course of operation, it
only controls any access to a work for non-infringing purposes (for example, it does not
include a process, treatment, mechanism, device, or system to the extent that it controls
geographic market segmentation by preventing the playback in New Zealand of a nonWWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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Equally striking is the apparent shift in relation the criminal provisions
in the ACTA, illustrated in Table 2.
Table 2: U.S. proposals on criminal provisions: January v. July 2010
January 2010

July 2010

Each Party shall provide for criminal
procedures and penalties to be applied at least
in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or
copyright or related rights piracy on a
commercial scale.
Willful copyright or related rights piracy
on a commercial scale includes:
(a) significant willful copyright or
related rights infringements that
have no direct or indirect motivation
of financial gain; and
(b) willful copyright or related rights
infringements for purposes of
commercial advantage or private
financial gain.
Fn: For purposes of this Agreement,
financial gain includes the receipt or
expectation of receipt of anything of value.

Each Party shall provide for criminal
procedures and penalties to be applied at
least in cases of willful trademark
counterfeiting or copyright or related
rights piracy on a commercial scale.
Infringements carried out on a
commercial scale include at least those
carried out in the context of commercial
activity for direct or indirect economic or
commercial advantage; however each
Party may treat acts carried out by end
consumers as outside the scope of this
Section.

This is an area of some importance to the U.S., which recently failed in
an argument that China’s thresholds for the imposition of criminal liability
for trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy failed to comply with the
TRIPS requirement to impose criminal penalties where such acts occur ‘on
a commercial scale.’74 But it is also an area where the differences between
the EU and U.S. are significant. The U.S. has consciously expanded
criminal law to cover end-user and non-commercial activities via the No
Electronic Theft (NET) Act of 1999. This is reflected in the U.S.’ initial
proposal, which is wide enough to render criminal single infringements
perpetrated for the purpose of avoiding paying for a copy of a work.
Certainly, on the initial U.S. proposal, file-sharing is treated as effectively
‘commercial’ (being done in exchange for receiving files)—and hence
criminal even without any evidence as to the significance of its impact. On
the other hand, criminalization in IP has been a controversial topic in the

infringing copy of a work)’: Copyright Act 1994 (N.Z.) s.226. In Australia, the definition
(found in s.10 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Aust.) has rather complicated wording designed
to exclude region-coding technology on movies and computer games, and technology that
seeks to control the kinds of ‘spare parts’ that will work in an electronic device, such as the
printer in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522
(6th Cir. 2004).
74
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 61; see Panel Report, China - Measures Affecting the
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EU: criminal provisions were dropped from the IP Enforcement Directive
of 2004,75 and a proposal for a second IP enforcement directive (‘IPRED2’)
which would include criminal provisions has been plagued by doubts as to
the competence of the EU, and doubts about the substance of the proposal.76
It is doubtful therefore that the the EU could ever have accepted the U.S.
proposal: the IPRED2 draft only ever referred to infringement ‘on a
commercial scale.’77
These developments, in both the anti-circumvention provisions and the
criminal provisions show that the global IP ratchet is not all one way, and
the FTAs have not been sufficient to assure that similar standards will
prevail in later negotiations. In short, we are not seeing multilateralisation
of the FTA standards nor are they the ‘starting point’ from which standards
can only go up. In fact, at all times the standards embodied in the ACTA
draft have been considerably weaker than we have seen in the U.S. FTAs or
in U.S. or EU internal rules. What minor countries like Australia or
Morocco have signed up to is of limited, if any significance once you are
negotiating with a more important player. It is clear that from Europe’s
perspective the key issue is the consistency of the ACTA text with its own
internally negotiated acquis communautaire. This is not to deny the
negative impact of the FTAs on countries that have signed them:78 but

Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009).
75
Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (OJ L 157, 30.4.2004); published
with corrigendum in OJ L 195, 02.6.2004, P. 0016 – 0025.
76
See Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property
rights, April 26, 2006, COM/2006/0168 final; COD 2005/0127 */ (‘IPRED2’); see
generally Monika Ermert, ACTA May Prompt Quick Restart to EU Harmonisation of
Criminal Enforcement of IP, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Dec. 21, 2009, 7:42 PM)
(summarizing past concerns as well as notes as to current developments).
77
See IPRED2, supra note 76, art. 3 (noticing that there is no definition in the
proposal of what would count as infringement on a commercial scale. It does appear that
the EU is not entirely prevented from negotiating on questions of criminal provisions),
Ermert, supra note 76 (explaining that competence is less of an issue following the entry
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, and there are some signs that the proposal for a directive
will be revived); see also THE STOCKHOLM PROGRAMME – AN OPEN AND SECURE EUROPE
SERVING AND PROTECTING CITIZENS, O.J. C 115/1, 4 May 2010 (recalling that in May
2010, the Presidency published the Stockholm Programme in which the European Council
“calls upon the Council and the European Parliament to consider as soon as possible
legislation on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property
rights’. However, such negotiations would be controversial and could be considered
‘policy-laundering’ – attempting to draft criminal provisions in international treaty in
advance of any European acquis communautaire).
78
Although I would argue that such negative impacts can only be assessed by
looking, in detail, at implementation. The impact of the AUSFTA was considerably less
than some people argued at the time it was concluded, although there certainly were
significant changes: see Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 13.
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rather, to point out that their pain, if there is pain, is their own,79 and cannot
be multilateralised.
Some commentators will no doubt note that this is nothing new: in the
context of multi-party IP negotiations, ‘North-North’ conflict and
accommodation have long been critical in shaping multiparty treaty text. In
the lead-up to the TRIPS Agreement, for example, Drahos and Braithwaite
have traced the ways that EU-U.S. differences over patents and royalties
from audiovisual works impacted on the text.80 Indeed, some of the same
North-North conflicts that operated during the TRIPS negotiations have
come back to haunt ACTA—particularly the differences between the EU
and U.S. over geographical indications. But there is a key difference in the
current context. As a colleague and I have pointed out in previous work,81
the bilateral agreements that were the ‘stepping stone’ to TRIPS for the
most part required countries to sign up to two kinds of provisions: (a)
existing multilateral standards (e.g., the Berne Convention) and (b)
provisions that were not controversial as between the developed countries
forming the ‘inner circle’ negotiating the TRIPS text. In the TRIPS
negotiations proper, an inner circle of developed countries then negotiated
text that perhaps industry was not happy with, and which were weaker than
either EU or U.S. law, but which accommodated most differences between
their systems.82 At a treaty level there was no real ‘stepping back’ from
existing treaty provisions. More recently, however, what we have are blocs
of countries establishing higher standards, not just domestically, but in
international agreements—and then stepping back to more general
provisions in the context of the ACTA negotiations.
But does it matter? It might be said that this misses the forest for the
trees: that even if the language of an ACTA ends up more abstract or
weaker than U.S. domestic law, the watered down version will still be
stronger than existing multilateral treaties—and that ‘two steps forward one
step back’ is still a net gain in protection terms. From the perspective of the

79

One important qualification must be noted on that statement. It is of course
possible that an FTA in one country will have negative impacts on other countries. For
example, in the access to medicines context, the more countries which take actions to
restrict the manufacture of generic drugs (for example, by extending patent terms or
granting extended forms of data protection), the more difficult it will become for other
countries to import generic drugs when they need them, although arguably it is unlikely to
stop supply as long as there are countries which consider it important to take a stand on
refusing to adopt such rules.
80
DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 15 at 143-146; see also DANIEL GERVAIS,
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, para. 1.20, 1.29-1.30 (2d ed.
2003).
81
Burrell and Weatherall, supra note 13.
82
DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 15, at 143-146
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IP industries supportive of the strong versions of IP provisions seen in U.S.
FTAs, while the ‘ideal world’ might see detailed provisions multilateralised,
perhaps a second-best alternative is to maintain strong provisions in
bilaterals and a slightly watered down version in multiparty text. The
model embodied in bilateral agreements can still, after all, be pushed via
unilateral measures such as the U.S. ‘Special 301’ process83 and its EU
equivalent84 as a benchmark against which ACTA compliance of trading
partners is assessed.
This is all true, but the end result is still not the inexorable rise of IP
standards so much as the proliferation of multiple (inconsistent) standards:
U.S. standards in its FTAs, EU standards in its FTAs, and different ones
again in an ACTA. This is not so much a one-way ratchet as an everywhich-way global IP ratchet and it is not costless—either to right holders or
to government (let alone users). More box-ticking, and more meetings on
counterfeiting, more reports on compliance with more treaty obligations
may give domestic and international bureaucrats and lobbyists something
(or lots of things) to do, but they are unlikely to lead to actual results in
terms of counterfeiting reduced. As I have previously pointed out:
There is a risk of confusion and fragmentation in this process,
particularly, one would think, for government departments and
enforcement bodies subject to multiple overlapping requirements found
in multiple overlapping agreements. In a context where we want
government to be more efficient, subjecting them to multiple sources of
regulation is not likely to lead to happy results. What would we rather
government be doing—actually encouraging innovation, or box ticking
on their customs processes to check compliance with the multiple
different obligations in different treaties? What should money be spent

83

See DRAHOS AND BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM (Earthscan 2001) at
246; Peter Drahos, Global Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPS at the
GATT, 13(1) PROMETHEU.S. 6, 9 (1995); see generally Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, 19 U.S.C. §2411 (1974) (describing the annual review in which the U.S.TR identifies
annually countries that according to its view deny adequate and effective protection for
IPR; categorising countries which fail into groups: Priority Foreign Countries”, “Priority
Watch List” countries or “Watch List” countries. Inclusion on a list may lead to
negotiations, and, in some cases, trade retaliation).
84
See generally Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in
Third Countries, supra note 14 (noting the announcement by the European Commission
that it would, from 2008, conduct a survey of the situation of IPR enforcement outside the
EU, based on consultations and other input including data on counterfeit goods seized at
EU borders. Like its U.S. counterpart, the EU Survey produces a list of list of priority
countries in which the counterfeiting and piracy of IP rights is considered to present a
serious problem, and which the Commission therefore believes should be the focus for
future work. The surveys to date are published at the website of the Directorate General of
Trade.
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on—grants for artists or yet more forms and bodies and meetings about
counterfeiting?85

Further, there seems to be no reason to believe that the process of
watering-down that we have seen in ACTA required by the need to reach an
accommodation between the U.S. and EU (and others) would not be
repeated in any future negotiation involving another significant player.
ACTA standards themselves could be watered down in any future
multilateral negotiations if the process of agreeing ACTA itself is any
guide. Any one of China, India, or Brazil could play a similar role to that
played by Europe in the ACTA negotiations: demanding alterations to the
text to accommodate its own model. Their law is different, for one thing.
Sticking with anti-circumvention laws, for example, India at the time of
writing is considering a Bill which would take quite a simple approach to
technological measures: it would criminalise circumvention for the purpose
of infringement, with a raft of exclusions including circumvention
undertaken ‘for a purpose not expressly prohibited by this Act’ (that is, to
do anything lawful) and no action against distribution of circumvention
Brazil’s recent copyright reform proposal also permits
tools.86
circumvention for purposes like fair dealing (which would be consistent
with ACTA) but would sanction use of technical measures to hinder or
prevent fair dealings. Neither model would seem to be an easy ‘fit’ with the
ACTA provisions—suggesting that, at least if these countries consider the
issues important, any attempt to multilateralise ACTA would hit significant
hurdles. China, of course, is unlikely to agree to criminal provisions which
would nullify its recent WTO win. It is worth noting, too, that we also have
a fairly good idea of the attitudes of all three countries towards the ACTA
negotiations and, in short, it is not friendly: all three made statements in a
meeting of the TRIPS Council in early June 2010. These statements
expressed a range of concerns: about the proliferation of IP standards in
different forums, the potential for enforcement measures to distort
legitimate trade; the upsetting of the various balances struck in TRIPS, and
in particular, the potential interferences with a country’s right to determine
the allocation of its own law enforcement resources. In sum, there is good
reason to believe that these countries would have difficulty simply
accepting the ACTA provisions in any future negotiations, justifying an
expectation that we could see them play a role akin to that played by Europe
85

Kimberlee Weatherall, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: What‘s It All
About?, available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=kimweatherall at 4.
86
India Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2010, s.65A
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in ACTA—modifying, and generalizing, the language in the agreement.
We might also wonder about how the bilateral IP provisions are going
to look in a post-ACTA world. If a watered-down ACTA is intended to be
‘a new standard of intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement to combat
the high levels of trade in counterfeit and pirated goods worldwide’—
recently agreed between countries sharing a goal of adopting high standards
of IP protection87—then what are the bilateral provisions? Excessive? By
failing to achieve a higher standard even where negotiations are conducted
between high-protection countries, ACTA has the potential to undermine
the push for higher standards, and validate a claim by opponents that the
bilateral provisions are unacceptable, excessive and a source of conflict
with other potential trade partners. It cannot, after all, be argued that the
ACTA negotiators are a lowest common denominator group: in fact, this is
the visual or political cost of including only countries with strong/high
standards: you can’t argue that there were compromises needed to
accommodate different kinds of interests. In reality, a watered-down
ACTA means to say that there were things that the U.S. does that not even
Europe, with its concerns for strong IP rights, considers appropriate or
justifiable.
None of the analysis above is intended to downplay the serious potential
impact of the ACTA. Analysis of the agreement’s potential impacts on all
kinds of important interests, from consumer interests to access to medicines
to innovation has been done by others as well as myself, and need not be
repeated here. None of this analysis should be taken as suggesting that the
ACTA is a good idea, or harmless. Rather, the points are more subtle ones,
but the lessons are there for various interested parties. For advocates and
opponents, for example, the development shows the importance of local
models particularly in important negotiating countries. Changes have been
wrought in the ACTA text over the course of negotiations in those areas
where the EU model differed from that in the U.S. This suggests
developing local models in other important countries as a strategy to
counter the attempt to ‘multilateralise’ any harmful ACTA provisions. For
scholars, I would suggest that even this brief review makes the question of
the dynamics of bilateral agreements much more interesting than as a
simple part of a one-way ratchet. Either way, ACTA’s development clearly
holds new lessons in international IP law-making.

87

Australia to negotiate an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, AUSTRALIAN
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE MEDIA RELEASE (Feb. 1, 2008), available
at http://www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/2008/sc_012.html.
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III.

LESSON TWO: THE PROBLEMATIC INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR
EXCEPTIONS

The course of the ACTA negotiations also offers a stark demonstration
of how difficult it will be to overcome a key weakness in our international
IP treaties: the absence of a proper treatment of exceptions and limitations.
This might be counterintuitive: one might think that a treaty about
enforcement ought to have little to do with exceptions and limitations. Such
a position is only superficially attractive, however:
strengthening
enforcement ‘across the board’ without thinking about exceptions risks
demonising behaviour which in the past has been tolerated to the benefit of
social welfare:88 imagine, for example, if enforcement was significantly
increased without addressing what kinds of private copies ought to be
allowed. But in any event, ACTA is not just about enforcement: the drafts
have always proposed the expansion of substantive rights,89 and most
relevantly, have included draft limitations in the form of provisions on safe
harbours for internet service providers. It is true that these exceptions were
proposed not so much for the benefits they may confer on online service
providers, but for the conditions which seek to facilitate enforcement.
Nevertheless, they are limitations on economic rights: not the most
important or fundamental ones, and not at all adequate, but exceptions
nevertheless. The way the drafts have developed suggests that negotiators
have not turned their mind to how effectively to manage limitations, instead
continuing to use standard methods of ‘adding up everyone’s existing
law’—a process that has turned out to be deeply problematic. As I explain
below, it is highly questionable whether the drafts as they have emerged
from the negotiation process will serve either to improve matters for right
holders, or to extend protection to online service providers in a way that can
assure the reduction of barriers to trade and the encouragement of
innovation in online services. But first, it is important to give some
background on why exceptions are such a poor fit within the dynamic
established by existing multilateral treaties in IP—and why this matters so
much now.
Earlier in this paper I mentioned the two axiomatic principles which
structure the multilateral IP treaty system so as to favour the creation and

88

See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use (Colum. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 333,
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1132247 (describing the importance of
‘tolerated use’).
89
In particular, provisions on secondary liability and anti-circumvention and rights
management information provisions, all of which go to the scope of the rights a right
holder has.
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expansion of IP rights: minimum standards, and national treatment.90 There
I noted the fact that these principles together work to encourage everincreasing IP standards and their inclusion in multilateral agreements. As
many commentators have noted, the other impact of these provisions is that
exceptions and limitations on IP rights are constantly at risk. Existing
flexibilities found in one treaty can be (and often are) limited in subsequent
agreements as part of the creation of ‘more extensive rights,’91 whereas the
attempt to limit rights found in an earlier agreement may contravene that
agreement.92 The international IP framework includes very few ‘ceilings’
or mandatory limitations:93 the Berne Convention itself contains just one,
for quotations;94 all the other exceptions (like most exceptions in
international IP treaties) are put in permissive terms: a country may, but is
not obliged to, recognise an exception.95 Furthermore, international IP law
includes limits on the kinds of exceptions which may be introduced, most
importantly the TRIPS provisions embodying the three step test found in
Articles 13 (copyright) and 30 (patent).96 This means that exceptions and
limitations introduced by a government are also subject to review by
international courts or the WTO Dispute Settlement Panels, and may be
overruled.97
90

See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
Compare TRIPS, supra note 18 at art. 30 (allowing for compulsory licenses of
patent provided the procedure in Article 30 of the Agreement is followed), with AUSFTA,
supra note 18 at art. 17.9.7 (allowing for such use only (a) ‘to remedy a practice
determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive’ or (b) ‘in cases
of public non-commercial use, or of national emergency, or other circumstances of extreme
urgency’); compare WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 8 at art. 11 (providing a very
broad anti-circumvention provision which allows for considerable discretion in how it may
be implemented), with AUSFTA, supra note 18 at art. 17.4.7 (providing a highly
prescriptive regime regarding anti-circumvention).
92
The text of the provisions cited in n*** above generally includes a specific
limitation to this effect. See for example TRIPS Article 1.1, which states that Members
may ‘implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement,
provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement’.
93
See P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT: FINAL REPORT 6 (2008)
(describing that ‘the Berne Convention was designed as a rights-centered instrument aimed
primarily at the protection of creative works across international borders’).
94
Berne Convention, supra note 18 at art. 10(1); see id. at Appendix B (enumerating
certain mandatory limitations like Article 2.8 of the Berne Convention requires that
protection not be given to the news of the day or miscellaneous facts; the WIPO Copyright
Treat states that there is to be no copyright protection for ‘deas, procedures, methods of
operation or mathematical concepts as such’ (Article 2) or the data itself in any compilation
(Article 5)).
95
See The International Copyright System, supra note 24 at 9.
96
But cf. TRIPS, supra note 18, at art. 17 (explaining the provision on trademark
exceptions found in Article 17, that is less stringent, requiring only that ‘such exceptions
take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of third parties’).
97
See Graeme Dinwoodie & Rochelle Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of
91
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While this structure looks, and is, unbalanced, it is readily explained, in
both historical and theoretical terms. First, as Hugenholtz and Okediji point
out, the key concern at the time that the Berne and Paris Conventions were
negotiated was the need to create safety nets for creators in a context where
most countries provided little by way of rights for foreign authors.98
Second, exceptions are adopted by individual countries on the basis of their
own cultural and information policy, to benefit local users, and based on
calculations as to what is appropriate given the local level of economic
development and sources of comparative advantage.99 In that context, it is
said that international IP treaties should allow for ‘policy space’ for
individual member countries to undertake their own balancing of these
considerations.100 Global mandatory or even minimum exceptions and
limitations established in the early 20th Century, for example, would have
imposed undue uniformity in a sphere that was the subject of wholly
domestic goals. Third, it could be said that there is no need for treaty
provisions to encourage countries to enact exceptions or limitations, as they
will be motivated by self-interest to do so. Further, countries have
historically had little incentive to seek exceptions of their trading partners in
international negotiations, owing to the absence of mutual benefit that
applies when countries agree to recognise exclusive rights. If Country A
and Country B agree to recognise a given economic right, then A’s authors
or inventors benefit in B’s market, and vice versa. In the case of
exceptions, benefits from A’s exceptions have historically tended to be
confined to users within A’s territory.101
Finally, there is inertia. Laws, like objects in physics, have a tendency
to remain where they are and take the application of ‘force’ to bring about
change. Legal change disrupts existing industry practice and once the
prospect of copyright or patent reform is raised it is difficult to confine the
Countries will quite
issues that become ‘open for debate.’102
understandably approach treaty negotiations on exceptions with a view to

Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 95 (2004).
98
See Kur and Ruse-Khan, supra note 18 at 11.
99
See Kur and Ruse-Khan, supra note 18 at 29.
100
See Jane Ginsburg, International Copyright: From a ‘Bundle’ of National
Copyright Laws to a Supranational Code? 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 265 (2000),
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Time for a Paradigm Shift? Exploring Maximum Standards in
International Intellectual Property Protection 1 TRADE L. & DEV. 56, 69 (2009).
101
See HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 93 at 37.
102
See generally Weatherall, supra note 41 (describing the history of the reform
process in Australia), Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change 68
OR. L. REV. 275, 278 (1989); Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative
History 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 869 (1987) (describing the history of the reform process
is the U.S.).
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ensuring minimal disruption.103 This effect is demonstrable: in the
negotiations preceding the 1967 Stockholm Revision of the Berne
Convention, where harmonisation of the reproduction right and its
exceptions was discussed, the assumption on which the whole process
proceeded was that it would be necessary to ensure that any provision ‘did
not encroach upon exceptions that were already contained in national
legislation.’104 More recently, when the Information Society Directive was
negotiated within Europe, the difficulty of choosing and delimiting the
scope of the limitations on copyright and related rights ‘proved to be a
daunting task.’105 The first proposal had 7 exceptions;106 the final text had
twenty-three, drawn in general terms which would allow most countries to
continue current practice, and only one of them mandatory.107 This
approach in Europe has not led to good outcomes for user or, arguably, right
holder interests. It has provided little by way of harmonisation: a detailed
study of the implementation found that most Member States have chosen to
interpret the limitations contained in the Directive according to their own
traditions, leading to a mosaic of different rules across Europe.108 In some
cases it had a limiting effect: in the United Kingdom, the government
appears to have taken their existing equivalent exceptions, and simply
added any additional conditions in the Directive: thus leading to narrower
exceptions than the Directive required.109 Further, as new circumstances
have arisen post-2001, the list has become a straitjacket.
The
comprehensive review of intellectual property law in the UK, the Gowers

103

ROBERT BURRELL & ALISON COLEMAN, COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: THE DIGITAL
IMPACT, 214 (Cambridge University Press, 2005) (discussing the Information Society
Directive exceptions and the role of ‘official inertia’) and 216 (discussing the Berne
Convention and states’ reluctance to give up their own exceptions).
104
SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY
AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 33-34, 64-65, 75. 479 (Kluwer Law & Taxation, 1987)
(noting that early rounds of the Berne negotiations experienced intractable debates over
exceptions and limitations), see also Michaly Ficsor, How Much of What? The Three-Step
Test and its Application in Two Recent WTO Dispute Settlement Cases 192 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 110 (2002).
105
Information Society Directive, supra note 60 at art. 5(2), Guibault, supra note 70
at 39.
106
See Guibault, supra note 70 at 39.
107
See Information Society Directive, supra note 60 at art. 5(1) (excluding certain
temporary and transient reproductions. Even this is arguably more like a limitation on the
meaning of the right of reproduction than an exception as such), see also Directive
2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal
protection of computer programs O.J. L. 111/16, 5/5/2009, arts. 5, 6 (describing other
directives with mandatory exceptions: the Computer Program in particular has mandatory
exceptions concerning back-up copies, testing, decompilation).
108
See Guibault, supra note 70 at 63.
109
See BURRELL & COLEMAN, supra note 103 at 235-36.
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Review made a series of recommendations for new exceptions:110 the UK
government response was that progress on many—even basic things like
private copying to ensure that ordinary technology use isn’t infringement—
would require action at an EU level.111
The ACTA negotiations on safe harbours for online service providers
(OSPs) have clearly demonstrated the same kind of inertia, with negotiators
evincing a desire to avoid disruption to local law, and to embody in
international agreement conditions matching those applying domestically.
OSP safe harbours were, perhaps, always going to be one of the hardest
areas in which to make compromises and one where governments would be
particularly keen to avoid disruption to local compromises. The negotiating
countries, after all, came to the table each with their own detailed (and
different) provisions in place already: representing, presumably, the
outcome of three-way (at least) negotiations between government, the
telecommunications and internet industries, and right holder groups. It
would also have been an area where opening up existing rules to reform
would be particularly sensitive. Recent years have seen a strong push on
the part of right holders to require OSPs to cooperate more actively with
enforcement, by introducing what have become known as ‘three strikes’ or
‘graduated response’ rules, requiring OSPs to cooperate with right
holders—first with warning letters to identified infringers, later with
technical measures or termination of service. Opening up these issues via
the ACTA would give rise to entirely justified accusations of ‘policy
laundering’: that is, an attempt to use an international agreement to bring
into force laws which are presently highly controversial at a domestic
level.112
110

UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
4-5 (2006), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=XhOz6cabI1gC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Gowers+Re
view+of+Intellectual+Property&source=bl&ots=k9ncuccFwQ&sig=yrbgyiBFH6FYmShks
uiIdrt1zFc&hl=en&ei=IQiuTNDGAoK88gaQkNnABA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result
&resnum=2&ved=0CBYQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false.
111
UK DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION AND SKILLS, DIGITAL BRITAIN
FINAL REPORT 113 (2009), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=vo4pfi0D5Q4C&pg=PT101&lpg=PT101&dq=%E2%8
0%98The+Government+has+considered+whether,+in+the+round+there+should+also+be+
a+modernisation+of+%E2%80%98fair+use%E2%80%99+rights+for+consumers+to+refle
ct+the+realities+of+the+digital+age.+The+Government+has+concluded+that+the+scope+f
or+such+modernisation+is+heavily+constrained+within+the+EU+copyright+framework%
E2%80%99&source=bl&ots=6z25qtkXQ&sig=McY5iZ24oyEAPbUh_pUzdcBVKCY&hl=en&ei=fwmuTNPbAcOC8gbg
v9y7BA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CBUQ6AEwAQ#v=onepag
e&q&f=false.
112
See Bill D. Herman & Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Catch 1201: A Legislative History and
Content Analysis of the DMCA Exemption Proceedings, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
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Looking at domestic laws of the negotiating countries, it is clear there
are many differences. The U.S. (and countries bound by U.S. FTAs) and
Europe effectively agree on a ‘safe harbour’ approach which protects OSPs
from liability for monetary remedies but does not prevent a court ordering
some action to protect copyright owners.113 But in the U.S. these safe
harbours are copyright-specific; in the EU they are horizontal (that is, they
apply to protect from liability across different legal regimes: trademark,
defamation, and others).114 More importantly, the two jurisdictions apply
different conditions before protection applies. While both recognise that
OSPs which are not merely providing network access ought to be required
to remove copyright infringing material in an expeditious manner, only the
U.S. has a fully elaborated scheme set out in legislation, including, for
example, detailed requirements for copyright owners seeking to give notice
of infringement; sanctions against abuse and misstatement; and a system for
having material restored pursuant to a ‘counter-notice’ from a user.115 The
EU system provides less explicit protection for users, leaving these issues to
local rules and industry codes.116 The U.S. also applies more stringent
conditions for availability of protection: in particular, it conditions the safe
harbours on an online service provider ‘adopting and reasonably
implementing’ a policy for the termination of service to repeat infringers:117
the EU has no similar requirement. The EU system contains a strong
prohibition on Member States imposing ‘monitoring obligations’ on
OSPs;118 the U.S. rules merely state that the safe harbours do not themselves
impose such a requirement.119 It should also be noted that other countries
involved in the negotiations have systems even more different. Canada, for
example, in Bill C-32, appears to propose an entirely different approach
built not on safe harbours but on an independent obligation to cooperate
with right holders. Under Bill C-32, a copyright amendment bill currently

L.J. 121, 128 (2006), Peter Yu, supra note 7 at 35-37 (explaining the fears concerning
ACTA).
113
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(j) (1998) (limiting the
kinds of injunctions which can be ordered), Directive 2000/31/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market OJ L 178,
17/7/2000, arts. 12-14 [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive].
114
The U.S. does have some horizontal protections, but intellectual property is
excluded from these: see 15 U.S.C. §230. The EU provisions in the E-Commerce Directive
(above n113) apply across the board.
115
See generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 113.
116
See E-Commerce Directive, supra note 113 at art. 16 (encouraging the formation
of industry codes).
117
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 113 at § 512(i)(1)(A).
118
See E-Commerce Directive,supra note 113 at art. 15.
119
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 113 at §512(m).
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under discussion, there would be a fairly broad exemption for online service
providers from liability for conduct by their users,120 coupled with a
separate positive obligation on online service providers to pass on notices of
infringement received from copyright owners subject to fixed (statutory
damages) payments for failure to do so121—and no obligation to take down
material. Interestingly, unlike the ‘expeditious removal’ requirement in the
EU and U.S., the obligation to pass on notices under the Canadian system
would apply to any online service provider—including one merely
providing transmission.122 Japan is different again.
Despite these differences, it is worth noting that there is significant
agreement at least at a high level of generality. With one exception, the
negotiating countries have or seem to be amenable to exceptions directed at
OSPs operating as neutral intermediaries as between third parties and
providing the basic infrastructure of the Internet.123 All seek to provide

120

Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian
Association of Internet Providers [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427; 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [hereinafter
Tariff 22] (describing the Canadian law that contains important exemptions for
intermediaries. Section 2.4(1)(b) provides that ‘a person whose only act in respect of the
communication of a work or other subject-matter to the public consists of providing the
means of telecommunication necessary for another person to so communicate the work or
other subject-matter does not communicate that work or other subject-matter to the public’.
This exemption was interpreted broadly in Tariff 22 decision, where the Canadian Supreme
Court held that it applied to shield ISPs from liability for communication and caching,
albeit subject to possible liability for authorising infringement in limited circumstances. As
the court noted, ‘section 2.4(1)(b) is not a loophole but an important element of the balance
struck by the statutory copyright regime’. Bill C-32 contains two further important
innovations: (1) s.31.1, which excludes liability arising solely by reason of a person
‘providing services related to the operation of the Internet or another digital network, [and
in the course of providing those services] provid[ing] any means for the telecommunication
or the reproduction of a work or other subject-matter through the Internet or that other
network’; and (2) a specific new form of secondary liability in s.27(2.3) which makes it
infringement ‘for a person to provide, by means of the Internet or another digital network, a
service that the person knows or should have known is designed primarily to enable acts of
copyright infringement if an actual infringement of copyright occurs by means of the
Internet or another digital network as a result of the use of that service’. In light of previous
statements in CCH and Tariff 22, it would seem likely that the Canadian courts would
focus on s.27(2.3) as the key form of secondary liability in an online context, rather than
expanding the law of authorisation, as has occurred in Australia and the U.S.).
121
Bill C-32, ss.41.25-41.26.
122
The Canadian system has a lot to say for it: not least, that it reduces uncertainty
for online service providers, in that the penalty for failure to engage in the required level of
cooperation is a fixed amount in statutory damages rather than a highly uncertain liability
for damages for copyright infringement.
123
The only real outlier here appears to be Mexico which does not have such laws in
place. However, commentators have noted that when the issue of ISP liability comes to be
negotiated, the government (and right holders) will be having to negotiate with ‘the richest
man in the world’, Carlos Slim Helu, Mexico Copyright Reform: Well That was Quick,
BLAYNE HAGGART’S ORANGESPACE (April 6, 2010, 6:25 PM),
http://blaynehaggart.blogspot.com/2010/04/mexico-copyright-reform-well-that-was.html.
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some relief from copyright liability to these providers assuming certain
conditions are met. All require some cooperation to assist right holders’
enforcement efforts, although the nature of that cooperation varies as
between different countries: it could involve expeditious removal of
infringing material; adoption of technical means to reduce infringement;
passing on notices; enabling the provision of information so right holders
can pursue litigation—again, the details vary but the basic goal of
facilitating right holders’ enforcement efforts is a common theme. Not all
of the systems explicitly provide protection against abuse (the U.S.’s
copyright law does; the EU does not) but it might be possible, through
discussion, to ascertain that in other countries general principles apply to
limit abuse.
What happened when the broad agreement and these differing models
came to the table in the ACTA negotiations? The same thing that has
happened in past discussions of exceptions and limitations—each country
put their own model on the table. In the earliest complete leaked draft we
have, from January 2010, we can see a series of separate proposals: one
from the U.S. based on the DMCA; an EU proposal based on the
Ecommerce Directive, another from Japan; hesitation about the inclusion of
information location tools (i.e. search engines) from New Zealand; queries
from Canada as to whether the system is predicated on ISPs being liable for
infringement in the first place; and a suggestion from Switzerland that the
whole thing be made optional since to recognise mandatory limitations
would reduce its existing domestic protection. Many of these differences
clearly persist in the April Public Draft (although positions of individual
countries are no longer reflected). By the time we see a draft dated July
2010, there is a single proposal but with significant question marks over the
conditions under which the safe harbours are intended to apply (with each
country persisting on proposing its own conditions remain part of the
scheme).
But this little bit of history repeating is predictable. It is far more
interesting to consider the way the process illustrates the difficulties that
arise in drafting: even in circumstances where the existence and broad
parameters of an exception are accepted by most parties. One explanation
for the difficulty in negotiating these exceptions is that the negotiating
countries (whether of their own volition, or at the behest of stakeholder
groups) are or were simply unwilling to give up part of the safe harbours
that was aimed at furthering the goal of enforcement online. But another is
that it is genuinely hard to reconcile differences in conditions? Leaving to
one side for a moment the really controversial condition—the U.S.’
requirement of a ‘repeat infringer policy’—any condition not the same in
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP

36

ACTA as a New Kind of International IP Lawmaking

different countries raises difficult issues given the detailed style of drafting
that the negotiators have adopted. Take the requirement of counter-notices.
Under the U.S. DMCA, if a right holder sends a notice to an OSP, claiming
that material hosted by the OSP is an infringement of copyright, and the
OSP removes that material, the OSP must also inform the relevant user;
who may then submit a ‘counter-notice’ stating that the subscriber has a
good faith belief that the material was removed or disabled as a result of
mistake or misidentification of the material. On receipt of a counter-notice,
the OSP must inform the right holder and replace the material within 14
business days unless the right holder files court proceedings.124 The EU has
no equivalent requirement included in its directives (although there would
be nothing to stop a Member State adopting such rules). In the ACTA texts
to date, this condition has remained in the text but in square brackets,
indicating that it is not agreed.
Now consider the perspectives of the various parties in the negotiation.
If a counter-notice system becomes a mandatory condition, changes to the
EU Ecommerce Directive would be required. From the perspective of the
EU policymakers, that is a highly undesirable outcome: not least because
ACTA was not meant to make substantive changes to the acquis
communautaire, and because it would necessitate re-opening the questions
not just in IP law but across the board,125 and see right holder groups
seeking the adoption of ‘three strikes’ or ‘graduated response’ rules. It is
unlikely the EU want to have that debate now. For the EU, even a counternotice condition (let alone something more controversial, such as a repeat
infringer policy) cannot be in the text. But consider then the position of the
U.S. First, the U.S. can expect criticism from user groups for failing to
protect their interests. The legal impact could vary, depending on how the
provision is drafted. If the conditions are exclusive, that is, if only the
conditions stated in the provision are allowed to be imposed on an OSP,
then the U.S. will be required to change its law to remove an established
end-user protection: thus eliciting accusations that the agreement is
unbalanced—and opening up the safe harbours to reform in ways that could
be very controversial. If the ACTA conditions are merely inclusive, and
further conditions can be imposed domestically, then the U.S. is clearly not
required to change its law—but there is a price, which is that the same
drafting that gives the U.S. freedom to impose additional conditions on
protection also applies to other countries—with unpredictable results. OSPs
will continue to face wildly varying market and legal conditions across the

124
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See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 113 at § 512(g).
As noted above, the Ecommerce Directive conditions are ‘horizontal’ ones.
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world—and, in extreme situations, any protection offered by the safe
harbour could be effectively gutted by the addition of further conditions. To
date, the latter drafting—an inclusive, rather than exclusive list—has been
prevailing. Drafts negotiated by the parties have moved towards the
removal of conditions not universally reflected in the negotiating parties’
law; and there is no provision which would appear to be aimed at reducing
the risk that the exception will be gutted by legislatures adding additional
conditions.126 This is, of course, consistent with a focus on enforcement but
hopeless for OSPs.
At the time of writing, it is not even clear that the OSP safe harbours
will be in the final text of ACTA—it may turn out to be too hard to
negotiate. Regardless of the outcome, this process illustrates the core
difficulties in drafting exceptions: How is the need for national autonomy
to serve local interests to be reconciled with a desire to foster global public
welfare and free movement of knowledge goods? Should exceptions be
mandatory or optional, and what principles, if any, should distinguish
between those which should be optional and those that ought to be
required? Should exceptions be drafted at a general level, leaving matters
of detail to signatories—with the attendant risk that individual countries
will hedge exceptions so far about with conditions that the impact of the
exceptions will be nullified? If we choose quite general language for
exceptions, do we need an equivalent to the ‘three step test’ so as to control
states’ ability to ‘gut’ exceptions and limitations at the behest of powerful
lobby groups or stronger FTA negotiating partners?127 And if we can
imagine a principle constraining justifiable ‘limits on exceptions,’ would it
be the kind of test that could be appropriately adjudicated by an
international body like a WTO Dispute Settlement Body, which tends to
eschew questions of domestic policy?
It may not be politically correct to say this, but if indeed, the parties are
unable to agree on real and effective safe harbours in ACTA, it will be an
unfortunate development: not just for ACTA, but for what it indicates
about IP law treaty-making. Some might argue that an ACTA would be
better off without the OSP provisions entirely owing to the controversy they
have generated: particularly since they have been seen as a stalking horse
126

See generally July text, supra note 10 (noting that the July text states that ‘Each
Party shall [or, for Switzerland, may] provide at least’ that OSPs shall not be held liable for
monetary remedies, and ‘that the application of’ the limitation ‘is conditioned on’ [certain
not yet concluded conditions]. This drafting suggests that these are minimum, but not
maximum conditions to be applied to the relevant OSP).
127
See Ruse-Khan, supra note 100 at 72 (discussing targeting the problem of weaker
parties agreeing to give up flexibility in the context of a trade negotiation by drafting
exceptions which state that a ‘party may not be obliged to …’ prohibit certain activities).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP

38

ACTA as a New Kind of International IP Lawmaking

for three-strikes rules. Early leaks confirmed this fear by including, in one
(U.S.) proposal, a requirement that an OSP ‘adopt and reasonably
implement a policy to address the unauthorized storage or transmission of
materials protected by copyright or related rights.’ A footnote stated that
‘an example of such a policy is providing for the termination in appropriate
circumstances of subscriptions and/or accounts on the service provider’s
system or network of repeat infringers.’ Although such drafting would not
require graduated response,128 it could be, and was, read as encouraging the
introduction of such laws. It does not follow, however, that standing on
principle and rejecting any kind of OSP protection is the best strategy.
Certainly if ACTA could be confined to genuine physical counterfeiting and
cooperation between law enforcement officials—that is, if ACTA were
confined to the remit it claims—then OSP protections would not be
required. Assuming, however, that ACTA (or any equivalent) is not to be
confined to pure physical counterfeiting, and is drafted to cover, for
example, remedies such as damages and injunctions or any online activity,
then exceptions for OSPs will remain important, and their absence would
render the agreement a one-sided and disreputable affair. An OSP safe
harbour with some conditions is better than higher and statutory damages
and more ready injunctions without that protection.
Including OSP safe harbours—and other exceptions—is important to
ACTA for a range of reasons. It is becoming more difficult to justify the
absence of exceptions and limitations in IP treaties. Many of the old
explanations have lost their salience. It is, for example, no longer truly the
case that the benefit of exceptions is confined to users in the country
providing them. Creative works and knowledge goods that build on
existing material and benefit from exceptions in order to do so now diffuse
more rapidly and broadly.129 Global trade in goods and services produced
in reliance on limits to IP protection (exceptions, duration limitations,
subject matter limitations) depends on international availability of similar
limits, and the absence of limits is a barrier to international trade.130 Certain
128

See generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 113 at § 512(i)(1)
(implementing an equivalent US law), Copyright Act 1968 s 116AH(1) (Austl.)
(implementing an equivalent Australian law under the AUSFTA), Roadshow Films Pty Ltd
v iiNet Ltd (No 3) (2010) 83 IPR 430 (Austl.) (explaining the case in which an Australian
court rejected arguments by right holders that an ISP was required to adopt something
similar to a three strikes policy).
129
See HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 93 at 38.
130
See Ruse-Khan, supra note 100 at 80 (noting the importance of this is
demonstrated in the TRIPS Preamble (which emphasises the need to ‘ensure that measures
and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to
legitimate trade’); Article 41.1 (stating that enforcement measures ‘shall be applied in such
a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for
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users’ rights also require international rather than merely local exceptions
to be effective. For example, the World Blind Union has pointed out that in
order to improve access to copyright material for the visually impaired
national organizations assisting with accessibility must be able to exchange
materials;131 the presence of exceptions in at least exporting and importing
countries is critical to making the Doha Declaration on access to medicines
operative. In a context, too, where FTAs that constrain exceptions and
limitations are becoming more commonplace, it also seems likely that many
smaller, less powerful nations now stand less in need of policy freedom or
flexibility, than of legal security and predictability about what exceptions
they are allowed to introduce consistent with international constraints such
as the three step test.132 The absence of guidance as to what exceptions
qualify may have a chilling effect;133 international consensus on allowable
exceptions (at least) could impose important constraints both on powerful
domestic lobbying groups and on the kinds of demands that can be made in
the framework of bilateral trade negotiations.134
Finally, there is the question of public perceptions as to the value and
fairness of the agreement. A perception that it is fair as between
stakeholders is important to IP law, which it is not readily ‘self-enforcing.’
By this I mean that IP law requires people to self-consciously refrain from
behaviours that are common, easy, and enjoyable: infringement is so easy
safeguards against their abuse’) and Article 40 (noting Members’ agreement ‘that some
licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights which restrain
competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer and
dissemination of technology.’) TRIPS Article 8.2 allows States to adopt measures to curb
abuses of IP rights).
131
See World Blind Union Proposal: WIPO Treaty for Improved Access for Blind,
Visually Impaired and other Reading Disabled Persons, art. 8, Oct. 23, 2008 (Annexed to
WIPO Document No. SCCR/18/5, PROPOSAL BY BRAZIL, ECUADOR AND PARAGUAY,
RELATING TO LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS: TREATY PROPOSED BY THE WORLD BLIND
UNION, May 25, 2009 (hereafter, World Blind Union Proposal), Judith Sullivan, Study on
Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for the Visually Impaired, WIPO Document Number
SCCR/15/7 February 20, 2007, at 119-122; see also Bill C-32, supra note 121 at § 32.01
(noting Canada’s recent attempt to address the need for international exchange of
accessible materials in its copyright amendment bill, Bill C-32 attempts to address this
issue: but the solution is confined to works of Canadian authors).
132
See Ruse-Khan, supra note 100 at 76-77 (explaining countries’ desire for this
certainty can be demonstrated in the proposal by Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua and Uruguay for
‘Work related to Exceptions and Limitations’); see also WIPO, PROPOSAL BY BRAZIL,
CHILE, NICARAGUA AND URUGUAY FOR WORK RELATED TO EXCEPTIONS AND
LIMITATIONS, WIPO Doc. SCCR/16/2, July 17, 2008, available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_16/sccr_16_2.pdf (noting the request
by Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua and Uruguay that WIPO’s Standing Committee on Copyright
and Related Rights (SCCR) begin work on prescribing a minimum framework of public
policy exceptions)/
133
See Kur and Ruse-Khan, supra note 25 at 8.
134
See id.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP

40

ACTA as a New Kind of International IP Lawmaking

to do and observing IP rights, particularly copyright, involves, particularly
these days, some self-denial. IP law therefore needs support from the
public in order to be effective, and in order to receive any such support IP
law needs to address the needs of all stakeholders.135 Treaties that
strengthen enforcement without addressing the needs of users look unfair
and will bring IP law further into disrepute. Nor is the need to engage with
fairness just a matter of appearance. There has been, over the last five years
or so, a definite uptick in momentum on questions of access, exceptions and
limitations: scholars are talking about them; NGOs and governments are
proposing them; law reform reports worldwide have suggested widening
them. If ACTA stands outside this trend, obdurately refusing to concede
the need for exceptions in addition to enforcement, it risks a backlash from
an organised, motivated set of people with well-developed ideas—and
makes it easier for countries not presently involved in the negotiations to
reject its outcomes out of hand. If ever there was a treaty which needed to
find ways to look more balanced, it must be the ACTA. In public relations
terms, ACTA started very badly, as an apparently secret, behind-closeddoors negotiation between select countries only: a process that has tended to
bring the negotiations into serious disrepute. Once the draft was released to
the public, the absence of balancing provisions was a key point of
commentary. While there have been improvements both in transparency
and content over time, perceptions remain, quite rightly, deeply negative.136
Including genuine limitations will not guarantee the treaty is welcomed with
open arms—but they would help.
It is certainly arguable that safe harbours for OSPs who provide the
basic structure of the Internet fall into the category of exceptions that ought
to be both international and mandatory. Mandatory global exceptions can
be justified on at least two bases: that owing to the global nature of the
activities concerned, the absence of such exceptions poses an unreasonable
and unjustifiable barrier to trade, or alternatively, that the exception will
‘generate positive spillovers to benefit global welfare ...[or facilitate] the
production of global public goods.’137 Both fit. The absence of exceptions
applicable to OSPs or the imposition on them of onerous conditions could
easily become a significant barrier to trade. A search engine, for example,
or a user-generated content platform that cannot escape liability in a
particular jurisdiction for copyright infringement which it has no power to

135

See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 97 at 97-98 (noting the importance of
‘tradeoffs’ in IP lawmaking); see also Jane Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name For
Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS (2002).
136
See generally Peter Yu, supra note 7.
137
HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 93 at 43.
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control could be prevented from operating in that jurisdiction; insofar, then,
as a goal of international IP treaty-making is the reduction of barriers to
trade, the reaching of common standards on this question falls well within
that goal. As for global public goods: the basic infrastructure of the Internet
which OSPs provide clearly generates positive spillovers globally, and it
could be argued the Internet is, itself, a global public good,138 or, at least, is
a fundamental tool for the creation and dissemination of what are
undoubtedly global public goods—information and knowledge.139
But how do we handle the difficulties of negotiations discussed above?
While the negotiators to date have not displayed any tendency to move
beyond historical methods of drafting exceptions, it need not be thus. There
is a body of thinking that could help. Advocates, policymakers, and
scholars have spent considerable time recently developing ideas for an
international framework for IP exceptions, particularly copyright
exceptions.140 We have seen a concerted effort on the part of the various
interested groups to envisage how limitations and exceptions might more
effectively be embodied at an international level. Recent scholarly
treatments have sought to tackle some of the difficult questions. Among
these efforts, two, at least, should be noted:141 the 2008 Report, Conceiving
an International Instrument on Limitations and Exceptions to Copyright, by
Hugenholtz and Okediji sponsored by the Open Society Institute,142 and the
Intellectual Property Rights in Transition (‘IPT’) project at the Max Planck
Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law.143 Both of
these efforts envisage the embodiment of mandatory exceptions or
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limitations in an international instrument.144 Both projects emphasise the
need for flexibly-drafted mandatory exceptions, plus provisions designed to
make it easier to introduce new exceptions: either in the form of a general
omnibus principle (Hugenholtz and Okediji) or the replacement of the
three-step test with a more ‘user-oriented’ test.145
Neither project, however, has to grapple with the nitty-gritty of how
these issues would arise in negotiations. A critical practical question, as the
Information Society Directive implementation demonstrated and the ACTA
negotiations confirm, is how to handle the combination of inertia, or
attachment to existing laws, and inconsistent conditions on exceptions. The
proposal that exceptions should be drafted ‘flexibly’ to allow local
balancing of interests and adjustment doesn’t address the problem that
exceptions could end up being gutted by the addition of conditions preexisting in local law.
Perhaps the closest that these discussions come to suggesting a means of
preventing such gutting is Max Planck’s proposal to strengthen Articles 7
and 8 of TRIPS. Thus Annette Kur has suggested that TRIPS could be
amended to add an Article 8a, which would create an obligation to ensure a
balance of interests and that users may use protected subject matter without
right holder consent.
1. Members shall take due account of the objectives and principles set
out in Articles 7 and 8 when formulating or amending their laws and
regulations. In doing so, they shall ensure that the protection granted
reflects a fair balance between private economic interests and the larger
public interest as well as the interests of third parties.
2. Members shall ensure that users may, without the consent of the right
holder, use protected subject matter, provided that such use does not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder, taking
into due consideration the normal exploitation of the right.146
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Similar ideas and proposals have been emerging from the advocacy
arena, as non-government organisations and governments have attempted to
draft international instruments on exceptions. There is nothing like actually
drafting text to make you grapple with the hard questions. Thus we have
the 2005 proposal for a Treaty on Access to Knowledge, which proposes
lists of mandatory exceptions which every country should have, plus room
for a flexible exception to allow for further uses not presently foreseen.147
In the policy arena, we have WIPO’s Development Agenda, in which
context the SCCR is required to engage in selecting exceptions ‘that should
form part of a prescriptive minimum global framework of exceptions’.148
The 20th Session of the WIPO’s Standing Committee on Copyright and
Related Rights held in June 2010 had several proposals before it on
exceptions and limitations: including a proposal by Brazil, Ecuador and
Paraguay in support of the World Blind Union’s proposals for a treaty
addressing access for the visually impaired,149 and a more recent and
comprehensive proposal from the Africa Group calling for a WIPO treaty
on exceptions and limitations extending also to education and research
institutions, libraries and archives.150 As you would expect, each of these
efforts envisages certain mandatory exceptions, none of which touch on
questions regarding OSPs.
More importantly, however, these mandatory exceptions are coupled in
both the World Blind Union proposal and the Africa Group proposal with
certain general principles designed, it would seem, to provide flexibility
without creating a situation where exceptions can be gutted by the method
of implementation. Both proposals contain:
1. Flexibility: through a provision stating that ‘Contracting Parties
shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing
the provisions of this Treaty’;151 and
2. Limits on flexibility: by including a provision stating that ‘shall
ensure that the implementation allows for timely and effective
exercise of authorized actions covered by this Treaty, including
expeditious procedures that do not in themselves create barriers to
legitimate uses, are fair and equitable, and are not unnecessarily
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complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time, time-limits or
unwarranted delays’.152
It has to be conceded that (2) above would be difficult to litigate, even
assuming someone could be found willing to take a country to task for noncompliance.153 Nevertheless, it does seek to provide some bulwark against
gutting of the exceptions. 154
These proposals suggest another way to approach a safe harbour regime
for OSPs. Such an approach would first, as suggested by all the initiatives
discussed so far, adopt relatively flexible and abstract language, in order to
accommodate the various domestic models. It would also seek to identify
the public policy goals of an OSP safe harbour, and the problems that may
arise from the imposition of conditions that are too strict, and then draft an
obligation on signatory countries to ensure—in drafting their conditions and
rules—that those ends were served and that the legitimate fears were
unrealised. Without attempting to draft actual language, it is not difficult to
identify its broad parameters, bearing in mind that the goal of such a
provision is to provide protection for OSPs while providing some assistance
in enforcement, and that the concern about conditions is that they would gut
the protection to OSPs, create barriers to global trade in information goods
and distribution of knowledge, and/or interfere with the rights and interests
of users, in particular the right to privacy. Such an exception:
• would allow, or preferably for all the reasons already outlined,
require countries to provide for protection from monetary
liability for OSPs, identified in broad terms as neutral
intermediaries providing facilities for the transmission,
communication, location or hosting of material online;
• would allow, or require countries to oblige OSPs (excluding
OSPs merely providing transmission) to take action on obtaining
knowledge of infringement. It would not require that such
obligations be conditions on the protection from liability:
recognising Canada’s different model of legislating a freestanding obligation subject to payment of a ‘fine’ for non-
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compliance. Nor would it require that the ‘action’ occur in the
form of ‘take-down’, recognising Canada’s ‘notice-and-notice’
system;
would allow for further conditions or requirements to be
imposed on OSPs, provided that such conditions:
o Must not give rise to barriers to legitimate trade;
o Must be fair and equitable, and not unnecessarily
complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time, timelimits or unwarranted delays to either enforcement of
intellectual property rights or authorised uses;
o Must not require OSPs actively to seek evidence of
infringement or to monitor the information which they
transmit or store;
o Must reflect a fair balance between private economic
interests and the larger public interest as well as the
interests of third parties, including the interests of
individual users;
o Are subject to laws protecting the right to privacy or
confidential information the disclosure of which would
prejudice law enforcement or the legitimate commercial
interests of particular enterprises, public or private, or
otherwise be contrary to public interest.

By allowing further conditions to be imposed on OSPs, an exception of
this kind would clearly allow for the introduction of three strikes or
graduated response provisions in signatory countries, which might cause
some people to object. However, for all the reasons discussed in
Hugenholtz and Okediji, and the Max Planck IPT project, as well as the
various historical reasons given above for why exceptions have not
historically been found in international IP law, it seems unlikely that
countries would wish to sign up to a provision that mandated that kind of
ceiling. An exception of this kind also respects the fact that countries may
wish to avoid significant disruption to local existing law. As efforts to draft
international instruments on exceptions and limitations suggest, flexibility is
a necessary part of drafting such rules: the better approach, then, is to put in
place principles to guide the exercise of that flexibility.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

ACTA is . . . complicated. Despite its trappings of almost vaudevillian
evil, it is more than just something to be opposed point blank (although it is
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that too, for many reasons explored elsewhere). It is more than another
attempt to increase enforcement and ratchet up standards (although it is that
too). It is also provides object lessons in the dynamics of international IP
lawmaking that we would all do well to learn from: scholars, advocates,
non-government organisations, governments, and treaty negotiators. I hope
there are various aspects of the analysis above that will provide food for
thought, but if there is one that emerges most clearly, I think, it is the
importance of developing alternative models: what we could support, not
just what we could oppose. Existing local models are critical in
negotiations: they are what gives a country reason to oppose provisions in
treaty negotiations. And models for exceptions that countries can sign up to
with minimal disruption are needed so we can make progress on that other,
critical side of the IP ‘balance.’
It is on questions of exceptions that some of the most urgent current
issues are arising in the international sphere: for advocates and users,
certainly, but also for negotiators and right holders. Without credible
efforts to instantiate exceptions, limitations, and user protections in
international agreements, IP law-making risks losing all credibility and any
buy-in from a large part of the world. Negotiators ought to be paying
attention to the thinking in this space; equally, advocates need to take
account of the historical dynamics on exceptions—dynamics which, as the
ACTA negotiations indicate, haven’t changed.
The lessons I think are clear. More work on the models. At least that
gives us something to build towards.
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